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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION 
ENDOWMENTS OF HIGHER EDUCATION INSTITUTIONS AND INDIVIDUAL 
INCOME TAX POLICY: 
WEALTH EROSION FROM A LOSS IN CHARITABLE CONTRIBUTIONS 
The most significant tax overhaul bill in over thirty years was enacted in 2017 and expected to 
have wide-ranging effects. The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act includes numerous policies that directly 
and indirectly impact the higher education sector and the effect to endowments was not addressed 
in the public debate leading up to enactment. Unlike expendable gifts, a reduction in endowment 
contributions has a cumulative effect because a gift to an endowment can benefit all subsequent 
years. Each year following a contribution, investment income earned on the original gift is 
available for spending and benefits escalate over time in amount, assuming the value of the 
original gift continues to grow. The purpose of this study is to analyze precisely the direct and 
indirect impact of personal income tax regulations on the charitable sector.  It will do so by 
disaggregating data to delineate clearly the differential consequences that distinguish higher 
education from other components of the broad charitable sector umbrella.  A model is developed 
to predict the erosion of endowment wealth following a decrease in contributions due to tax 
policy using panel data from a previous ten-year period assuming the tax policy was first 
effective beginning in year one. The erosion of overall endowment wealth is gradual, and 
subsectors of higher education are predicted to experience varying rates of attrition. Regression 
analysis is then used on giving by source data to institutional and endowment characteristics 
indicative of greater reliance on contributions from individuals to the endowment; the results are 
suggestive but inconclusive. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Universities and the higher education environment are evolving rapidly with 
exponential growth in student enrollments and demand for services while enduring 
decreasing state appropriations and federal support. Frequent tuition hikes reflect higher 
costs and test the financial limits of most families even as educational institutions 
routinely seek private gifts to supplement resource inflows. At the same time that the 
nation has increased angst about the cost of higher education, the media regularly report 
the growing levels of wealth of many prominent universities and colleges. After nine 
successive years of growth, contributions to U.S. colleges and universities reached 
$46.73 billion in 2018 and seven institutions reported single gifts over $100 million 
(Council for Advancement and Support of Education [CASE], 2019a). At the end of 
2018, what is believed to be the largest single private donation to higher education was 
recorded to an endowment. Johns Hopkins University announced a $1.8 billion 
endowment gift for need-based scholarships from businessman and former New York 
City mayor Michael Bloomberg (Hartocollis, 2018). Not all universities are so fortunate. 
A loss in contributions would alter the already-strained financial operations of higher 
education institutions. Erosion of endowment wealth requires special consideration. 
This study examines the long-run financial impact, identified as wealth erosion, of 
a sustained loss in contributions to the endowment base. While the research context is 
within a change in tax policy for individuals, other events could be the catalyst for a 
sustained loss in giving. To extend the tax policy context, I consider institutional 
characteristics that may reflect higher education endowments with greater reliance on 
giving from individuals to build and maintain endowment wealth. Those institutions have 
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a more urgent need to evaluate the impact of the most recent change in individual tax 
deductions of charitable contributions which are predicted to decline. 
Endowments of Higher Education Institutions 
Endowments garner a great deal of attention, both positive and negative, for 
higher education institutions – not only as a metric to determine rank and education 
quality but also due to political fury over hoarding wealth. The current endowment 
environment features highly publicized mega-gifts and market values in the millions and 
billions. The most extensive annual report of higher education endowments is the Study 
of Endowments published by the National Association of College and University 
Business Officers (NACUBO). The annual reports have been published since 1991, 
jointly with the Commonfund Institute from 2009 until 2017 and with Teachers Insurance 
and Annuity Association of America (TIAA) in 2018 (NACUBO, 2019b). The 2018 
NACUBO-TIAA Study of Endowments (NTSE) surveyed 802 U.S. colleges, 
universities, and affiliated foundations that, together, reported over $616.5 billion in 
endowment assets. Approximately 13% of the respondents had over $1 billion 
endowments (accounting for 77% of all university endowment assets) and only 9.1% had 
endowments less than $25 million (NACUBO, 2019a). In a separate study, Moody’s 
(2015) reported the ten wealthiest education institutions held nearly one-third of the total 
wealth of the 503 organizations analyzed. The top 40 institutions held almost two-thirds 
of the total wealth with median cash and investment balances of $6.3 billion (Moody’s, 
2015). Universities have institutional policies to dictate acceptable risk and spending 
rates and teams of investment managers to oversee daily operations of their endowments. 
Uniform law seemingly exists to protect both the endowment and the original donor 
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restrictions that often require income to only be used for capital projects, professorships, 
or scholarships. Administrators and donors want to grow and preserve endowment funds. 
Politicians and tuition payers want those funds to off-set the rising cost of an education. 
The diversity of interested parties makes for a complex environment. 
Endowment defined. 
Permanently restricted donations are legally defined as gifts the donor requires to 
be maintained in perpetuity but allows the earnings from the original gift to be used by 
the charitable organization. Permanent restrictions, in theory, never expire and most are 
in the form of endowments.  A patron may donate a large sum of cash and investments 
with the caveat that the gift be invested indefinitely and permits the nonprofit to expend 
only the earnings from the investment corpus.  The earnings are considered temporarily 
restricted if the patron has designated either how or when those earnings are to be used. 
With a strong economy, permanent endowments are desirable for the revenue stream 
produced. When the economy weakens, the revenue streams from permanent 
endowments diminish and the corpus is unavailable to supplement the shortfall. Donor 
restrictions are central in any discussion related to endowments. 
Endowment categories are determined by the existence and extent of donor 
restrictions. “True” endowments are well understood to be invested funds donated to a 
charity which cannot be expended but produce an income stream to benefit the charitable 
organization. Even with this recognized technical definition, the term is used rather 
loosely in higher education. In today’s university, “true” endowment funds are 
commingled with donations that have a finite investment restriction (term endowments) 
and funds the university chooses, but are not required, to treat as an endowment (quasi-
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endowments). Statutory law defines endowment funds as “an institutional fund or part of 
an institutional fund that is not wholly expendable by the institution on a current basis” 
(Uniform Law Commission, n.d., p. 7), which excludes quasi-endowments. The quasi-
endowment requires only board or management action to expend the funds since there is 
no donor restriction dictating use of the funds. Accounting standards and legal statutes 
distinguish the three categories of endowments but other environments, especially within 
the higher education sector, do not. The popular press, often using the NACUBO 
endowment studies as a source, and most public discussions refer to “endowments” as 
inclusive of true, term, and quasi-endowment funds. 
Endowment and university finances. 
The endowment environment of today is not representative of the past, nor is it a 
fruition of what was once expected. American universities, on average, had 25% of 
income generated by their endowment in the early 1900s (Kimball & Johnson, 2012b).  
In this same era, the General Education Board (GEB) published a recommendation that 
universities should strive to have endowments cover 40% to 60% of university 
expenditures (as cited in Kimball & Johnson, 2012b, p. 13). The reality is universities 
report endowments fund, on average, 10% of operating costs (NACUBO, 2019a) – a far 
cry from the 25% average and GEB’s 60% goal of the early 1900s. The 802 U.S. colleges 
and universities participating in the most recent NTSE reported spending more than $21.6 
billion supporting university operations (NACUBO, 2019a). On average, 49% of the 
distributions from endowments was spent on student scholarship and other financial aid 
programs and 16% supported academic tutoring and other related functions (NACUBO, 
2019a). 
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Historically, endowments provided steady streams of cash income generated from 
only the safest investments. Legal definitions of fiduciary responsibility became less 
restrictive to enable endowments’ fuller participation in financial markets. Investment 
strategies became more aggressive, distribution policies became more conservative, and 
the effort and energy devoted to growing the endowment multiplied. In one century’s 
time, universities moved from what is best for the institution to what is best for the 
endowment. Many variables factor into determining the level of support provided by the 
endowment stream including market performance and expenditure decisions. While the 
basic expectation of providing support has not changed, the manner in how it is 
accomplished has morphed in transformative ways. Two elements that influence the 
mode in which the income supports the university are investment strategy and 
distribution policy. 
Investment strategy. 
The role of investment strategy on endowments should not be underestimated. 
The strategy serves as the roadmap for the university to create wealth and generate 
income by outlining how assets will be allocated to various investment risk categories. 
More than just following the tide of all investors, current endowments have the size and 
prestige to be influencers and less-wealthy endowments are mimicking the large and 
high-profile university endowments. The investment strategies employed by universities 
evolved slowly but significantly over more than a century, from maximizing income to 
maximizing growth.  
At the end of the nineteenth century endowments were invested in “safe” 
securities such as bonds, real estate, and mortgages with an aim to maximize spendable 
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income. During his tenure as Harvard’s president from 1869 to 1909, Charles Eliot 
proclaimed and published his university strategy for wealth that largely hinged on 
endowments. Kimball and Johnson (2012a) researched Eliot’s written correspondence of 
both letters and annual reports that documented his “free money” strategy. Eliot’s stance 
was that wealth determined rank in the competition between universities and wealth was 
defined by the endowment. He advocated for unrestricted gifts to the endowment – 
unrestricted in both how the funds could be invested and how the funds could be spent 
(thus, “free money”). By the 1920s Eliot’s strategy was the normal mode of operation and 
Harvard and Yale had initiated mass fundraising to build endowments (Kimball, 2015; 
Kimball & Johnson, 2012a).  
As endowment funds increased, institutions started adding high-yield corporate 
stock to their portfolios (Center for Social Philanthropy Tellus Institute, 2011). The stock 
market crash of 1929 and the Great Depression that followed changed the investing 
landscape. Throughout the 1930s endowment portfolios increased holdings in common 
stock, either by design or by accident as fixed-income instruments lost value or went into 
default (Goetzmann, Griswold, & Tseng, 2010). Goetzmann et al. (2010) attributed 
empirical work performed in the 1920s as the cause for a subsequent shift away from the 
“preservation of capital and avoidance of risk” investment strategy to a new focus on the 
equity premium. By the mid-1930s portfolios were about 16% invested in common stock 
and by 1940 many endowment portfolios exceeded 45% investment in equities (Center 
for Social Philanthropy Tellus Institute, 2011; Goetzmann et al., 2010). The endowments 
and the economy recovered and continued to grow. Along with a new 60/40 target mix 
(60% equities and 40% bonds) in the 1960s, endowment portfolios not only increased 
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investment in equities but also moved away from dividend stock and into growth stock 
(Center for Social Philanthropy Tellus Institute, 2011). The dawn of the “maximize 
growth” investment strategy had arrived.  
The 1970s mark a pivotal shift in the endowment environment. The economy 
experienced “stagnation and rapid inflation” and universities were facing an “impending 
decline in the number of eighteen-year-olds” (Kimball, 2014, p. 895). Not until this era 
were equities considered more stable than bonds (Fishman, 2014). Universities began a 
new trend of achieving endowment growth through investment instead of fundraising and 
“total return investing” came onto the scene (Center for Social Philanthropy Tellus 
Institute, 2011). Total return investing redefined the spendable investment income to 
include unrealized capital gains and called for greater diversification (Fishman, 2014). 
External investment managers were now heavily used by the universities to manage the 
endowments. These investment professionals introduced Modern Portfolio Theory (MPT) 
to the endowments while also increasing the risk tolerance of endowment managers 
(Fishman, 2014). MPT correlates risk and return, theorizes greater risk brings greater 
return, and manages risk by diversifying investments (Center for Social Philanthropy 
Tellus Institute, 2011). Diversification was achieved by moving into international equities 
and alternative investments (Fishman, 2014).  
MPT applied to endowment management became known as the “Endowment 
Model of Investing” and most of the larger endowments soon adopted the new strategy to 
emulate the high returns garnered by Yale and Harvard (Center for Social Philanthropy 
Tellus Institute, 2011; Fishman, 2014). The Endowment Model of Investing relies on 
diversification into nontraditional, illiquid securities (alternative investments) aimed at 
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producing excess returns independent of underlying market actions (Fishman, 2014). The 
securities traded, and strategies employed, were not well understood or regulated. The 
1990’s market rewarded the universities that had adopted the Endowment Model of 
Investing with unprecedented returns (Ehrenberg, 2002). The tech bubble burst in 2000 
but industry leaders Harvard and Yale had limited exposure to the domestic market and 
no significant change to the investment strategy resulted (Center for Social Philanthropy 
Tellus Institute, 2011). However, the financial crisis of 2008 that led to the Great 
Recession created multiple problems for institutions reliant on their endowments. 
Endowment values declined and portfolios lacked liquidity, resulting in difficulty in 
meeting collateral and investment obligations to hedge funds and private equity partners 
(Fishman, 2014). The average university endowment lost more than 24% of market value 
in 2008 and many large endowments continued to report double-digit losses in 2009 
(Goetzmann et al., 2010). Capital was not available to seize new investment opportunities 
and alternatives could not be unloaded (Fishman, 2014). Fishman (2014) blamed the 
endowment catastrophe during the Great Recession on the “underappreciation of risk and 
the overconfidence in the ability to manage it” by universities and their endowment 
managers (p. 233).  
Despite the devastating results of the last decade, the Endowment Model of 
Investing continues to be employed into fiscal year 2018. According to the 2018 NTSE, 
average asset allocations continued to strongly favor alternative investments (52%) and 
equities (36%) with the remaining 12% in fixed-income securities (8%) and liquid 
securities (4%) including cash (NACUBO, 2019a). However, these averages related 
primarily to the largest institutions where the average investment in alternatives was 58% 
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(NACUBO, 2019a). Smaller institutions were investing in lower risk models averaging 
only 11% in alternatives (NACUBO, 2019a). While the risk remains, the rewards 
continue to be volatile; universities’ average return for 2018 was 8.2% after a rebound to 
12.2% in 2017 from a negative 1.9% in 2016 (NACUBO, 2019b). Following two years of 
strong returns, the ten-year average was 5.8% by 2018 as compared to the average long-
term return objective of 7.2% reported by universities (NACUBO, 2019a). The 
investment strategy employed determines the level and type of return generated which 
can (or cannot) be spent for university purposes. 
Distribution policy. 
The expectation of endowments has always been, and continues to be, to provide 
financial support to the university. The investment strategy balances risk and return in 
order to protect the longevity of the endowment, but fund disbursement must also be 
factored into the long-range objectives. Universities typically establish a formal policy, 
known as the spending rule, that states a formula for calculating annual distributions from 
the endowment. Spending rules attempt to provide appropriate disbursement levels from 
the endowment while protecting the corpus from deterioration. The spending rule will 
also specify a spending rate to be used – the specific percentage applied to the 
endowment value to convert into a dollar distribution. As noted in the 2018 NTSE, “In 
order to maintain the inflation-adjusted value of the endowment over long periods of 
time, spending should not exceed the endowment’s nominal returns less experienced 
inflation.” (NACUBO, 2019a, p.24). Brown and Tiu (2013) identified seven categories of 
spending rules employed by university endowments: 
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1. Decide on an Appropriate Rate Annually: Determines the spending rate deemed 
appropriate on a yearly basis. 
2. Increase Prior Year's Spending by a Percentage: Adjusts spending upwards 
each year, using either a simple formula or one based on the inflation rate. 
3. Spend a Percentage of a Moving Average of Market Values: Determines annual 
payout as a percentage of an average of beginning-of-period market values over a 
pre-specified series of past periods. 
4. Spend a Percentage of Current Yield: Spend a percentage of current income 
generated during the investment period. 
5. Spend a Percentage of Assets Under Management (AUM): Determines annual 
payout as a percentage of the beginning-of-period fund assets for the current 
period. 
6. Hybrid Rules: Uses a simple formula to combine two or more different payout 
categories into a single spending rule. 
7. Other Payout Rules: Uses a formula or approach that differs from those listed 
above or did not provide a complete set of information. (p. 9) 
Consistent over the previous decade, the 2018 NTSE found 75% of university 
endowments used the percentage of a moving average of market value spending rate 
while another 20% used a hybrid rule that included the moving average approach 
(NACUBO, 2019a). Market value can greatly vary from the beginning of one fiscal year 
to the next, therefore a rolling average calculation (based on multiple years of quarterly 
or annual market values) is now a common element of the payout formula to avoid 
extreme distribution variations period to period. 
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Market values fluctuate and can cause the effective spending rate (distribution 
amount as a percentage of the endowment fair market value at the beginning of the fiscal 
year) to vary from the stated policy payout rate. The NTSE study indicates average 
effective payout rates only slightly varied in the last ten years but were on a downward 
trend from the previous decade. The average effective rate was 4.4% in 2018 compared to 
a range of 4.2% and 4.6% since 2009 (NACUBO, 2019b). Since 2001 the peak average 
effective rate was 5.1% in 2003 (NACUBO, 2008; NACUBO, 2019b). Public institutions 
averaged lower effective spending rates than private colleges and universities over the 
last two decades and higher dollar-value endowments tended to average higher effective 
spending rates, although the last few years has noted exceptions (NACUBO, 2008; 
NACUBO, 2019b). 
Summary. 
The wealth managed through university endowments is significant and more 
complex than a typical corporate investment fund. Commingling of possibly thousands of 
funds with various donor restrictions on how and when funds should be disbursed, and 
the expectation of indefinite life, add to normal allocation-of-risk deliberation. 
Investment strategy created from this environment, the Endowment Model of Investing, 
heavily relies on equities and high risk, illiquid alternative investment. Return is 
generated by increased value, not cash dividends or interest income, blurring the 
distinction between what can and cannot be spent. Spending policies attempt to balance 
the need to protect the endowment purchasing power and the responsibility to support 
university operations with distributions. 
 
12 
	
Historical Review of Tax Policy 
To encourage the public services provided by charitable entities and supported by 
donors, the government subsidizes the nonprofit sector activities by incentivizing giving 
through charitable contribution deductions for donors. The tax deduction reduces the cost 
of giving by decreasing personal taxable income equal to the value of the contribution. 
Donors in higher tax brackets receive greater benefits as they are taxed at higher rates. If 
a donor is in the 35 percent tax bracket, each dollar of contribution and deduction results 
in a lower tax obligation by 35 cents. In simplest form, the price of giving each dollar is 1 
– t where t is the marginal tax rate, or in the case of the example, 65 cents. For donors in 
the 25 percent tax bracket, the price of contributing is 75 cents per dollar donated. 
Additional tax benefits are realized for gifts of appreciated property by avoiding capital 
gains tax. A taxpayer that sells investments, for example, with a cost basis lower than fair 
value would be subject to a capital gains tax on the difference. If the taxpayer instead 
donates the investment to a charitable organization, no capital tax is owed and the 
charitable contribution deduction is equal to the fair value of the donated asset. 
The deduction continues to be of interest to Congress during fiscally stressed 
times as it diverts significant revenues from the government coffers. The Joint Committee 
on Taxation (2018) estimated $58 billion of federal tax revenue is forgone from 
charitable contribution deductions annually including approximately $10.1 billion from 
charitable contribution deductions to educational institutions. Giving USA reported 
contributions to colleges and universities are estimated to be two-thirds of the education 
category (as cited in Bellfleur, 2010, p. 18). The deduction also greatly matters to higher 
education administrators for the long-held belief that the tax deduction stimulates giving 
13 
	
and contributions are of significant importance to these institutions. A brief review of 
significant tax policies related to charitable contributions follows. 
War Income Tax Revenue Act of 1917 and Individual Income Tax Act of 
1944. 
The personal income tax was created with the Revenue Act of 1913 and the 
charitable contribution deduction followed shortly after with the War Income Tax 
Revenue Act of 1917 (Rosenberg, Steurele, Ovalle, & Stallworth, 2016). The charitable 
deduction was intended to motivate charitable giving and to define the personal tax base 
as net of donations (Rosenberg et al., 2016). Charitable deductions are only allowable if 
the contribution is made to a qualifying charity. The War Income Tax Revenue Act of 
1917 provided the first statutory language to define the permissible organizations as those 
“operating exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific or educational purposes, or to 
societies for the prevention of cruelty to children or animals” (as cited in Smith, 2016, p. 
7). Since then, literary organizations and those that foster national or international 
amateur sports competition were added to the list of qualifying charities (Smith, 2016). 
The definition of qualifying organizations has stood the test of time, but much else about 
charitable deductions continued to change.  
In 1939 only 5% of the population paid income taxes but in less than a decade it 
grew to encompassing close to 65% of the population, creating concerns about 
administration of and compliance with personal income taxes (Smith, 2016). The 
Individual Income Tax Act of 1944 introduced the concept of the standard deduction to 
simplify tax calculations (Smith, 2016). Election of the standard deduction eliminates the 
requirement to track and calculate expenses eligible for an itemized deduction. In 
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addition, the charitable deduction limitation, previously 15% of taxable income, was 
changed to 15% of adjusted gross income (Lindsey, 2002). The latter provision of the 
Individual Income Tax Act of 1944 increased the allowable charitable deduction as 
adjusted gross income could be higher than taxable income. The former provision 
reduced the number of taxpayers that benefited from the charitable deduction because the 
standard deduction commonly exceeded the available itemized deductions for low- and 
middle-class households. 
Tax Reform Act of 1969. 
Tax reform in the 1950s and early 1960s made modest adjustments to the 
charitable contribution deduction, primarily by increasing the limitation as a percent of 
adjusted gross income. The Tax Reform Act of 1969 increased the deduction limitation to 
50% for qualifying charities and 20% for certain other charities, now recognized as 
private foundations. Establishment of private foundations in the United States was 
stimulated by massive fortunes generated from the Industrial Revolution (Thelin & 
Trollinger, 2014). The wealthy initially moved into the philanthropic arena either out of a 
feeling of responsibility or a need to improve image. By the 1950s the tax structure 
motivated the wealthy to use foundations as a tax shelter. Congress, aware of numerous 
cases of the wealthy receiving tax benefits without subsequently engaging in 
philanthropy, passed the Tax Reform Act of 1969 in part to combat the abuse (Marsh, 
2002). The Tax Reform Act of 1969 established a minimum distribution requirement and 
an excise tax on net investment income for private foundations and limited the tax 
benefits of donating appreciated property to all charity types (Lindsey, 2002; Waleson, 
n.d.). 
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Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 and Tax Reform Act of 1986. 
Congress made a historic move with the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 by 
creating a non-itemizer charitable contribution deduction. The provision was a pilot 
project intended to combat the reduction in charitable contributions and government 
services experienced throughout the 1970s (Smith, 2016). For five years donors that 
elected the standard deduction were also eligible to claim charitable contribution 
deductions, normally mutually exclusive options. The non-itemizer deduction was phased 
in over the five years from 1982 with both a percentage and dollar of donation limitation, 
25% per dollar of donation up to $100, until full deductibility with no cap in 1986 
(Lindsey, 2002). As noted by Smith (2016), “1986 now stands as an anomaly in the tax 
laws as the only year since the standard deduction was introduced, in which non-
itemizers could fully deduct their charitable contributions” (p. 19). Subsequent research 
has considered the tax price elasticity of giving for non-itemizers using this single year. 
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 is noteworthy for what it did not enact as much as 
what it did enact. The non-itemizer charitable contribution deduction created by the 
Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 was slated to sunset in 1986 and was not extended 
with the Tax Reform Act of 1986, even though the provision survived the House and was 
heavily debated in the Senate (Smith, 2016). The Tax Reform Act of 1986 also increased 
the standard deduction and reduced marginal tax rates, increasing the tax price of giving 
for most taxpayers (Clotfelter, 1990). 
Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017. 
The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 (TCJA) was signed into law in December 
2017 (U.S. House, 2017). Very few provisions of the TCJA directly addressed charitable 
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contribution deductions. Cash donations to public charities, previously limited to 50%, 
increased to 60% of the taxpayers adjusted gross income (Nevius, 2018). Seating rights 
for collegiate athletic events, previously considered a charitable contribution, were 
excluded as a donation (Nevius, 2018). While the former increased and the latter 
decreased potential tax benefits of giving, neither were expected to change the tax price 
of giving as much as other TCJA provisions. Most elements of the TCJA indirectly 
affected the charitable contribution benefit through changes to standard deduction 
amounts, eligibility of itemized deductions, and reduction of marginal tax rates. 
The TCJA reduced marginal tax rates and shifted tax bracket income ranges 
which, in isolation, increased the tax price of giving for a taxpayer. The top marginal rate 
under the TCJA is 37%, decreased from 39.6%, increasing the tax price of giving for 
each dollar from 60.4 to 63 cents. Single taxpayers with $100,000 of taxable income have 
a marginal rate of 24% under TCJA and, if itemizing, a 76-cent tax price for each dollar 
given. In the year prior to TCJA, the tax price was 72 cents reflecting the marginal tax 
rate of 28%. For high-income filers the repeal of the Pease limitation on itemized 
deductions and the alternative minimum tax exemption increase potentially results in 
lower marginal tax rates and higher tax prices of giving (Michel, 2017). Due to the 
shifting of the tax bracket ranges, a few income bands have a higher top marginal tax rate 
under TCJA, but the majority of filers either have a decrease or no change to their top 
marginal rate. 
The increase in the standard deduction also increased the tax price of giving for 
many filers. By nearly doubling the standard deduction, a significant number of taxpayers 
stopped itemizing deductions and opted for the simpler tax return preparation method. 
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Changes to allowed itemized deductions also increased the number of filers electing the 
standard deduction. Deductions for unreimbursed employee expenses, tax preparation 
fees, hobby expenses, investment fees, and other miscellaneous deductions subject to a 
2% floor were eliminated under the TCJA (Bonner, 2019). State and local tax deductions, 
which includes income and property taxes, are now subject to a $10,000 ceiling (Nevius, 
2018). The mortgage interest deduction ceiling for new agreements reduced from 
$1,000,000 to $750,000 and is no longer available for second homes (Nevius, 2018). As 
previously noted, the TCJA also disallowed the deduction of charitable contributions that 
result in seating rights for collegiate athletic events (Nevius, 2018). By lowering and 
eliminating these deductions, it is difficult for taxpayers to have enough qualifying 
itemized deductions to be advantageous over the standard deduction. The increase in the 
standard deduction combined with the loss or cap of numerous eligible itemized 
deductions reduced the number of filers itemizing deductions. Non-itemizers receive no 
benefit from charitable contributions and have a tax price of giving equal to 100%. 
Problem Statement 
Tax policy has both intended and unintended consequences and interest groups, 
including charitable organizations, lobby legislators and the public to inform and 
influence decision-makers. Prior to the enactment of the TCJA, the not-for-profit sector 
voiced concerns about the potential impact to contributions citing reports that predicted 
giving would decrease by $4.9 billion to $16.3 billion annually and have devastating 
results for programs of charities (Channick, 2017; O’Neil, 2018). The need for accurate 
and thorough research on the predicted effects is of upmost importance to the legislative 
process. The public discourse prior to enactment of the TCJA did not fully address the 
18 
	
long-run impact for a large subsector of charitable entities – those with significant 
reliance on endowments. The giving source – individuals, estates, corporations, other 
organizations – is also a factor in relevance of the research. Research results point toward 
the need for a more specialized application based on the subsector within the charitable 
industry. 
Extensive research has been performed on the tax-price elasticity of giving, 
including post-implementation simulations of specific tax policies. In the 1980s the 
nonprofit sector warned of significant drops in contributions if the then-proposed 
Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 and the Tax Reform Act of 1986 were enacted, 
much like recent media reports related to the TCJA. A $10 billion, or 20%, decline in 
giving from contributions was expected (Clotflelter, 1990). Ricketts and Westfall (1993) 
found a slight overestimate with predictions for the 1983 and 1985 decrease in giving 
based on the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981. Changes in marginal tax rates and 
other elements of the 1980s tax laws led high-income taxpayers to reduce giving by less 
than predicted but, as expected, the taxpayers with the largest change in tax price 
demonstrated the greatest effect (Auten, Cilke, & Randolph, 1992; Clotfelter, 1990). 
Even as the tax laws made it less beneficial to give, average contributions increased 
(Auten et al., 1992; Clotfelter, 1990). Research findings on the 1980’s tax acts were 
primarily based on the charitable industry as a single sector. Clotfelter’s (1990) 
simulation for the Tax Reform Act of 1986 predicted a surge in contributions in 1986 
relative to 1987, decreased giving in 1988, and even larger drops in appreciated property 
gifts after 1986. Clotfelter (1990) extended the findings to specific subsectors and found 
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only two experienced the predicted pattern in giving, higher education and museums, an 
indication the forecasted effects are more relevant to specific subsectors.  
The measure reported in most research is not only broadly related to the entire 
charitable industry, but also is an estimate for a single year inclusive of all types of giving 
– expendable for current year operations as well as nonexpendable for endowment 
building. For example, Gravelle and Marples (2010) predicted the decrease in overall 
giving from an itemized deduction cap proposal for the 2011 federal budget as .28% 
assuming low tax-price elasticity, 1.44% decrease with moderate elasticity, and 2.27% 
decrease with high elasticity. Very few studies examine effects on a granular level. 
Cordes (2011) simulated the potential effects of a 28 percent cap for the maximum rate at 
which all charitable contributions are deductible and disaggregated the simulated changes 
by different types of charitable causes. The study calculated a 1.4 percent reduction in 
total revenue for higher education nonprofits caused by an assumed ten percent loss in 
contributions (Cordes, 2011). Even fewer studies examine more specific giving such as 
donations to endowments of higher education. Milton and Ehrenberg (2014) simulated 
proposed tax policies using historical data for university and college endowments and 
found the long-run impact of eliminating or reducing charitable contribution deductions 
would impair small-endowed schools the greatest.  
University wealth, measured by the endowment value per student, is associated 
with greater efforts to build the endowment and giving toward the endowment 
(Ehrenberg & Smith, 2003). While there is significant research on variables correlated 
with alumni giving to higher education institutions, little is available on other sources of 
giving or profiles of donors to endowments. Individuals, not just alumni, contribute 
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toward endowment and are subject to personal income tax laws. Corporations and other 
organizations, while also subject to tax law, do not have the same or as significant of 
incentives to donate. Measuring impact for the not-for-profit sector broadly leads to 
interested parties lacking erudition needed for a well-informed debate. 
Scope of the Study 
Currently there is limited research on tax policy effects in higher education. 
Personal income tax policy has primarily been examined in the context of charities as a 
single industry with little attention given to specific subsectors within the industry. For 
the research that is available on tax policy implications for higher education, findings 
primarily identify the impact on overall giving and do not address the long-run effects on 
endowments. This study attempts to quantify the long-run impact of the TCJA on the 
endowments of higher education institutions.  By using historical endowment giving, 
return, and spending, I estimated the ending market value of the endowment ten years 
post-implication of the TCJA had the policy been enacted in 2008. The components of 
TCJA addressed only relate to personal income tax provisions and do not encompass 
corporations, bequests, or other organizations. For this reason, I also sought to identify 
the institutional characteristics of universities with heavier reliance on individual giving 
to endowments. 
The research questions addressed in this study include: 
1. What is the long-run financial impact of a tax policy proposal that changes the 
tax price of giving on endowments of higher education institutions? 
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2. What institutional characteristics identify institutions with greater relevance to 
personal income tax policies measured by higher reliance on individual giving 
to university endowments? 
Contributions of the Study 
Research on tax price influence for specific charitable causes is limited and using 
broad nonprofit data to analyze the impact to a subsector may result in misleading 
assessments. Most studies that simulate the impact of tax policy on charitable 
contributions aggregate all giving and focus only on the change in revenue, overlooking 
the complexity of endowments. Generalized estimates are not appropriate for the portion 
of the nonprofit sector heavily reliant on endowments, as is the case with higher 
education, arts, and private foundations. For endowment giving, it is short-sighted to 
measure the impact in terms of a single-year reduction in revenue. The full consequences 
of the single-year revenue loss will be realized over multiple years. This study examines 
the comprehensive impact by accounting for the long-run implications. The research 
findings provide an important contribution to ongoing debates about rising higher 
education costs and accumulating endowment wealth by universities. Likewise, the 
findings provide insight into the universities and colleges that are most susceptible to the 
endowment projections. As policymakers consider tax policies to correct or improve the 
issues and administrators testify to the impact of policy proposals, research on the 
financial consequences will be an important element necessary for a well-informed 
debate. Without thoroughly considering the financial impact to the higher education 
subsector, tax policies may result in unintended consequences contrary to the original 
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purpose. While this study is limited to higher education, the methodology can be applied 
to other subsectors that have a similar high reliance on endowments. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
 
This literature review examines previous research critical to supporting the 
importance of this study. The chapter is divided into sections aimed at addressing three 
fundamental questions. Why does impact on endowments matter? What variables impact 
endowments? Does tax policy impact contributions? A brief history of the endowment’s 
significance to the university and exploration into the theoretical rationale for holding 
endowments speak to the first question. Research is then reviewed for each component of 
the endowment growth formula: contributions, return on investments, and fund 
distributions. The last half century produced extensive research on tax price elasticity of 
giving with many advancements and refinements aimed at determining tax policy 
influence. Finally, a review is provided of the limited research simulating tax policy to 
quantify impact on higher education endowments. 
University Endowment 
Endowments existed in the earliest histories of American higher education and, 
according to Hansmann (1990), “played a more important role in the finances of 
universities in the nineteenth century than they do now” (p. 23). Hansmann noted that 
neither Harvard nor Yale held significant endowments until public funding ceased in the 
early 1800s, requiring the institutions to actively seek new funding. By the 1840s, 
endowment income generated more than 40% of their annual budgets (Hansmann, 1990). 
Even though unprecedented large gifts were flowing into many universities in the late 
1800s, the finances of institutions were largely the responsibility of trustees and key 
wealthy donors (Bremmer, 1988; Kimball, 2015), but many institutions depended on 
endowments to be able to charge no or low tuition (Thelin & Trollinger, 2014). 
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Endowments were expected to generate income for the university in order to 
support operational and capital costs. By 1900 Harvard was the endowment role model 
with about 50% of income generated by their endowment as compared to an average of 
25% for all universities in America (Kimball & Johnson, 2012b).  Endowment income 
contributed significant support in the 1920s and 1930s; 52% of Stanford’s and 32% of 
University of Chicago’s budgets were provided by endowment income during this time 
period (Goetzmann et al., 2010). In this same era, the General Education Board published 
a recommendation that universities should strive to have endowments cover 40% to 60% 
of university expenditures (as cited in Kimball & Johnson, 2012b, p. 13). Universities 
realized Harvard had a competitive advantage and began to more fully appreciate the 
potential value of an endowment. Those interested in the higher education sector had 
strong faith in the future of endowments as a primary revenue source. Jesse Sears, an 
education academic, noted in his 1922 historical study of philanthropy in higher 
education, “At the present rate of growth, and with no more than normal expansion, these 
colleges will in time become practically independent of income from other sources” (p. 
67).  His predication, however, did not come to pass. 
A consistent measure of support is not available for much of the remaining 1900s. 
By the 1990s, according to Helms, Henkin, and Murray (2005), endowment income 
accounted for only 5.2% of private institution revenues and less for public institutions. 
Smith (2015) found the Ivy League colleges provided over 30% of operating budgets 
from endowment income in 2009 and 2010. The most recent NTSE reported universities 
have an average of 10.3% of their operating budget funded by endowments (NACUBO, 
2019a). There is disparity according to size with the largest institutions reporting an 
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average 16.7% and the smaller institutions reporting 6.9% of their operating budget 
supported by the endowment (NACUBO, 2019a). 
If endowments are not contributing significantly to operating budgets, why are 
these investment vehicles so heavily revered and guarded? Tobin (1974), in one of the 
earliest papers on endowments, asserted governing bodies of “an endowed institution are 
the guardians of the future against the claims of the present” and cited equity 
perseveration as the purpose of endowments (p. 427). Hansmann (1990) provided the 
most oft-cited theoretical exploration into why universities hold endowments, including 
to serve as a financial buffer, insure long-run survival of reputation, protect intellectual 
freedom, and assist in preserving the current generation’s values. Fisman and Hubbard 
(2003) found evidence that nonprofits use endowments as precautionary savings devices. 
Helms et al. (2005) noted higher education endowments specifically serve as 
precautionary savings and further studied the impact of donor restrictions on the 
management of the endowments. However, Brown, Dimmock, Kang, and Weisbenner 
(2010) examined university behavior in response to the technology bubble collapse and 
did not find income-smoothing behavior. Instead, universities, in response to the financial 
shock, reduced operating expenses and cut the endowment payout rates. Hansmann 
(1990) noted spending policies based on a portion of the endowment value violate the 
notion of a financial buffer. Based on university behavior during the Great Recession, the 
Center for Social Philanthropy Tellus Institute (2011) found evidence contradicting the 
assumption that endowments help protect operations, documenting canceled projects and 
loss of jobs.  
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Universities benefit from having large endowments in national rankings of 
colleges and credit analysts’ evaluations of financial strength. College rankings are 
important to attract students and provide prestige. Endowment size, stated in total and as 
a per-student-enrolled figure, is often referenced as an indication of financial and 
reputational strength in mainstream media and the institutions’ student recruiting 
materials. The ability to obtain debt enables growth, capital investment, and a 
competitive advantage over peer institutions. Hansmann (1990) also noted trustees, with 
more business than education backgrounds, focus on the financial assets as a measure of 
success, creating a culture with increased importance placed on endowment performance. 
Core, Guay, and Verdi (2006) found most nonprofit organizations with excessive 
endowments paid higher CEO and director salaries and did not exhibit subsequent 
growth. They concluded excess endowments are associated with greater agency 
problems. After examining data on investment committee membership of universities, 
Brown, Dimmock, Kang, and Weisbenner (2014) found university presidents are in the 
position to exert significant influence over endowment distribution decisions. As 
Hansmann (1990) pointed out, the endowment management and spending rules seem 
inconsistent with the compelling reasons for establishing endowments.  
Donor restrictions may require perpetual life of endowment gifts and these 
restrictions are legally binding and limit the university’s ability to control distributions. 
However, not all endowments consist of only permanently restricted gifts and most 
universities establish quasi-endowments that function in the same manner without the 
external constraints. As tuition costs and student debt continues to rise, focus is turning to 
these endowments as a source to reduce the cost of higher education. Two-thirds of 
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education endowments are permanently restricted, and an estimated 80 percent of public 
universities’ and 55 percent of private universities’ accumulated wealth consist of 
restricted endowments (Calabrese & Ely, 2017; Waldeck, 2009). Therefore, private 
universities are more likely to have the flexibility to spend from their endowments. Donor 
restrictions are a valid premise for protecting the corpus of the endowment, but not sound 
reasoning for exponential growth. The Government Accountability Office (2010) 
released a study on university endowments finding that institutions had not only 
preserved but increased the purchasing power of endowment funds over the previous two 
decades. Ehrenberg and Smith (2003) found selective private research universities and 
liberal arts colleges with higher levels of endowment wealth per student had higher levels 
of giving from all sources. They also found higher levels of endowment wealth per 
student were associated with a greater share of annual giving directed towards building 
the endowment – indicating that the wealthy schools will continue to get wealthier.  
While all the aforementioned reasons for maintaining large endowments make 
financial and operational sense, they are not framed in the tax-exempt purpose of higher 
education. Thelin and Trollinger (2010) argued “the public derives little or no discernible 
benefit from the accumulation of charitable funds” (p. 7). Providing financial security, 
improving rankings, and maintaining liquidity are organization-sustaining movements, 
not strategies to further a charitable purpose. Other reasons are discussed, but Hansmann 
(1990) closed with the simple proposition that universities are maintaining large 
endowments out of habit.  
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Summary. 
The contribution of the endowment to the operating budget has declined but the 
perceived value to higher education institutions has not. Without consensus on the 
purpose and objectives of endowments, underlying concerns of the general public, 
legislators, and media remain: how much is enough for an endowment size and can an 
institution can have too much endowment. In the absence of understanding why 
endowments are protected, research focuses on if and how endowments are safeguarded. 
University Endowment Management 
University endowment research centers on the management of the entities as 
investment vehicles. This section outlines the key elements of growth: contribution, 
return, and distribution. Goetzmann and Oster (2013) found evidence that universities 
mimic nearest competitors in asset allocation decisions subsequent to superior 
performance by the other university, an indication that universities are not only actively 
managing their own endowments but are also exerting energy in benchmarking within the 
higher education sector. Cejnek, Franz, and Stoughton (2017) found behavior of a 
substitution effect belief between donations and returns for universities. Brown et al. 
(2014) created a “President’s Benchmark” measure and found supporting evidence that 
university presidents make decisions based on the endowment value at the beginning of 
their tenure. These studies demonstrate universities have overall endowment value 
objectives that require strategic management of all the growth components. 
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Growth components. 
Contribution. 
Research on giving to higher education institutions concentrates, primarily, on the 
giving of alumni. Cunningham and Cochi-Ficano (2002) found institutions with more 
need-based aid had higher levels of alumni giving but no correlation with merit-based 
aid, while Clotfelter (2003) found individual alumni receiving need-based aid were less 
likely to subsequently give. Clotfelter’s study used a sample of alumni from three cohorts 
of students at fourteen elite private institutions and provides evidence that satisfaction of 
the college experience increases giving, more significantly for students that attended a 
public high school or attended their first-choice college (2003). Not surprisingly, 
Clotfelter (2003) and Bruggink and Siddiqui (1995) showed income positively impacted 
level of giving and Clotfelter (2003) also found giving was increased for the first 
institution attended and by liberal arts graduates. Other positive determinates are alumni 
activity and participation in social fraternity organizations (Bruggink & Siddiqui, 1995; 
Harrison, Mitchell, & Peterson, 1995). Bruggink and Siddiqui (1995) noted increased 
geographic distance to the institution from current residence negatively impacted giving, 
however Lara and Johnson (2014) found the opposite in a study with a large sample from 
one institution. 
Numerous institutional characteristics are considered related to giving. Positive 
correlations were found with a larger portion of full-time students (Liu, 2006; Terry & 
Macy, 2007; Harrison et al., 1995), the private institution structure (Terry & Macy, 
2007), more faculty per student (Cunningham & Cochi-Ficano, 2002), and higher 
acceptance rates (Terry & Macy, 2007).  Liu (2006) found rankings were positively 
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correlated with giving from non-alumni. Leslie and Ramey (1988) found no correlation 
for non-alumni but did find increased alumni giving with institutional prestige measured 
by university age and ranking. 
Multiple studies found endowment value was positively correlated with giving 
from both alumni and non-alumni even when measured in a variety of ways such as total 
value (Terry & Macy, 2007), per alumnus (Leslie & Ramey, 1988), and per student 
(Cunningham & Cochi-Ficano, 2002). Terry and Macy (2007) found higher student debt 
averages and percent of Pell Grant recipients decreased alumni giving. While Liu (2006) 
positively correlated in-state tuition charges to alumni giving, Terry and Macy (2007) 
found negative correlation with cost of room and board. Several studies examined state 
appropriations. Liu (2006) and Leslie and Ramey (1988) linked state appropriations as 
negatively associated with alumni contributions, with Leslie and Ramey extending the 
correlation to all giving groups. Liu (2006), however, found higher levels of state funding 
increased giving from corporations. Gianneschi (2004) agreed but specifies that it is for 
restricted giving and included non-alumni individuals. However, Gianneschi (2004) 
found no relationship between unrestricted giving and state appropriations for any group. 
Return. 
Performance is dependent on asset allocation.  As addressed in a previous section, 
the evolution of the endowment investment strategy shifted from maximizing 
distributable income to maximizing growth, achieved by selection of asset categories in 
which funds are invested. The investment return, or performance, of endowments creates 
resources for distributions to support university operations and increases the earning 
power by growing the corpus. Lerner, Schoar, and Wang (2008) found university 
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endowments outperformed other institutional investors, such as corporate pension funds, 
over a 20-year period ended 2005. Agarwal, Nanda, and Ray (2013) confirmed the 
finding. Barber and Wang (2013) supported the commonly-held belief that elite 
institutions, Ivy League and top-SAT schools, earn strong returns as compared to all 
university endowments but also found the average university endowment performed in 
line with the market’s average benchmark returns, rebutting the belief that higher 
education endowments are superior performers. More recently Dahiya and Yermack 
(2018) examined the nonprofit sector endowments with similar results. They found 
higher education institutions significantly underperformed the market, more so than the 
entire nonprofit sector. Selective schools were the strongest performers of the higher 
education sector but performed near the market average (Dahiya & Yermack, 2018). 
The variation in university endowment performance has been contributed to the 
size of the endowment, access to professional fund managers, and asset allocation. 
Cejnek et al. (2017) countered the size-advantage belief in favor of higher-risk investing 
and greater access. Their study revealed that the endowment size corresponded to the 
type of management borne out by asset allocation profiles. Larger endowments allocated 
more endowment resources to higher-risk classes of investments and spent more as a 
fraction of endowment wealth while smaller endowments endeavored to accumulate 
endowment wealth (Cejnek et al., 2017). Brown, Garlappi, and Tui (2010) found strategic 
asset allocation and active management accounted for the largest portion of variation in 
university endowment returns between institutions. In a study of the overall nonprofit 
sector, Heutel and Zeckhauser (2014), noted the largest endowments reported the highest 
returns and had a higher portion of alternative investments, a high-risk asset class. Barber 
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and Wang (2013) found the strongest returns from the largest endowments and attributed 
the performance to the significant allocation to alternative investments. University 
endowment investments in alternatives, on average, doubled in the decade between the 
mid-90s and the mid-00s (Lerner et al., 2008). Agarwal et al. (2013) attributed superior 
performance to the opportunity to directly invest funds, as opposed to investing in an 
index-fund model, but no evidence that access to the advice of investment consultants 
had an impact. 
Distribution. 
Distribution research centers on spending rule policies and endowment 
management decisions as evidenced by modification to those policies. Simulation studies 
attempt to find the optimal spending rule (Blume, 2010; Cejnek et al., 2017; Kaufman & 
Woglom, 2005), however, factoring in the complexity and variety found in policies 
across endowments, there is no universally-accepted ideal spending rule. Universities 
have established, modified, suspended, and overhauled payout formulas with earnest. 
Brown and Tiu (2013) studied university behavior vis-à-vis spending rules and payout 
rates, distinguishing that the rule is the policy the university employs to calculate 
distribution amounts and the payout rate is the percentage level applied in the spending 
rule. Using a sample of 628 university endowments, Brown and Tiu (2013) examined a 
recent decade and found approximately 25% of endowments changed their spending 
policy and 18% changed their spending rate in any given year. For the sample examined, 
half of the institutions never made a change, 16% made only one change in the examined 
timeframe, more than 34% made at least two changes, and one institution made a change 
in each of the eight years examined (Brown & Tiu, 2013). Milton and Ehrenberg (2013) 
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found spending rate variations did not significantly contribute to the observed dispersion 
of higher education endowments. No evidence was found in the Brown and Tiu (2013) 
study that returns were impacted by the frequency of policy changes. Institutions with 
larger allocations of alternative assets had lower probabilities of changing the spending 
policy but larger endowments with lower relative returns were more likely to modify 
(Brown & Tiu, 2013).  
Research supports endowment policies are adjusted in response to external 
environments. Dybvig (1999) found payouts slowly increased after positive shocks but no 
evidence of declines following negative shocks. Gilbert and Hrdlicka (2013) agreed 
payout rates increased with positive shocks but concluded payout rates also decreased 
with negative shocks. Ryan (2016) found during the Great Recession of 2008-09 some 
universities ignored their own formulas and opted to decrease payouts at rates greater 
than the formulas dictated. He characterized this move by universities as evidence that 
“they acted to preserve the value of the endowment instead of using the endowment to 
preserve the value of the university” (Ryan, 2016, p. 26). Brown et al. (2014) included 
the 2001-02 tech bubble burst and the Great Recession and also found that universities 
reduced payout rates after these negative shocks to endowments, but universities did not 
change payout rates following positive shocks, nor did universities respond likewise to 
negative shocks to other revenue sources such as governmental funding. Only Brown and 
Tiu (2013) addressed the use of special appropriations (temporarily-instituted payouts 
outside of the spending formula), noting if the option was available the likelihood an 
institution adjusted spending policies was reduced. 
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Summary. 
The importance of how endowments are managed is supported by the 
proliferation of research on each of the growth components. Contributions, return on 
investments, and distributions from the endowment all impact the size and spending 
power of the asset. Recent history reflects a conservative approach to spending from the 
endowment but a speculative approach to asset allocation. Profiles of primary donor 
groups can alter the practices of philanthropy units and research on university behavior 
will continue to inform administrators seeking to optimize performance. 
Tax Price Elasticity of Giving 
This section begins with an instructive review of the context and application of 
tax price elasticity of giving. Following the background is a summary of the published 
literature reviews covering the first two decades of research and an overview of the 
traditional view. Key research methodology and data modifications for the most recent 
three decades are then reviewed. The remaining portions of this section address empirical 
research topics of anticipated, transitory, and persistent changes, elasticity of non-
itemizers, elasticity based on income class and giving-size classes, price elasticity by 
nonprofit sector, and elasticity for charitable bequests. 
Responsiveness to changes in the charitable contribution deduction and tax rates 
is measured by the tax price elasticity of giving – the percentage change in donations 
resulting from a one percent change in the price of giving, all else being equal. Tax policy 
is interested in determining if it is more economical to provide the tax benefit to generate 
donations for the nonprofit sector or to directly subsidize the sector instead. Tax price 
elasticity of giving is used to estimate the impact of changes in tax code on charitable 
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giving. Price elasticity of giving is believed to be negative; an increase in tax price causes 
a decrease in giving. Negative one indicates the increase in donations exactly offsets the 
decrease in tax revenue. Calculated values of elasticity at or above the absolute value of 
one are considered elastic and, likewise, below the absolute value of one are inelastic. 
Elasticities greater than the absolute value of one signify giving will increase by more 
than the loss in tax revenue to the government. If the value of induced giving is greater 
than the value of the lost tax revenue, referred to as elastic, the charitable deduction is 
considered “treasury efficient.” Most literature exploring the tax price elasticity of giving 
also examines the income elasticity of giving. Income elasticity measures the percentage 
change in giving resulting from a one percent change in after-tax income. Income is 
believed to be inelastic, although questions of persistent verses transitory income 
challenge this belief.  
The application of tax price elasticity of giving in tax policy analysis estimates the 
impact of proposed tax code changes. Studies often assume a single tax price elasticity, 
such as the Congressional Research Study by Gravelle and Marples (2010) which 
assumed a -0.5 elasticity to estimate the impact of an itemized deduction cap. A recent 
report by the Indiana University Lilly Family School of Philanthropy (2017) estimated 
the impact of various proposed tax reforms under two different assumptions – a low price 
elasticity of -0.5 and the higher elasticity of unity, -1.0, citing the reason for doing so as 
the significant debate that still exists regarding elasticity estimates (p. 7). For an example 
application, assume a tax price elasticity of -1.1. If the marginal tax rate decreases from 
35% to 30%, the tax price increases from .65 to .70, a 7.7% increase. The increase in tax 
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price would result in an 8.5% decrease in contributions (7.7% increase in tax price x -1.1 
tax price elasticity), assuming all other factors remain unchanged. 
While there is consensus that many factors potentially stimulate or depress 
contributions, research questions the extent tax incentives motivate those changes. 
Regression analysis is used to estimate these elasticities and the traditional log-linear 
model takes the general form: 
!"	$%,' = 	) +	+,(!"	.%,') +	+01!"	2%,'3 +	+45%,' 	+ 	6%,' , 
where G is giving measured by the charitable contribution deduction, P is the tax price 
discussed above, Y is personal income, D is a vector of demographic variables (most 
commonly marital status, age, and number of dependents), and i and t represent the 
individual taxpayer and time. Coefficients +, and +0 are the estimates of tax price 
elasticity and income elasticity, respectively. Duquette (2016) notes most studies employ 
“panel fixed-effects models that use households at different income levels as 
counterfactual comparison groups for each other” (p. 51). 
One of the most significant challenges to elasticity research is distinguishing the 
effects of price and income. Tax price is directly linked to income, as tax rate is 
determined by income bracket. Typically, price variation is based on the disparity in 
marginal federal income tax rates across people and time (Bakija & Heim, 2011). A 
second significant challenge is overcoming bias resulting from omitted variables that 
influence giving. Researchers routinely control for various demographic variables such as 
age, marital status, and number of dependents. More elusive variables, such as wealth and 
religion, are difficult to estimate and others, such as attitudes and social capital, are 
impractical to measure.  
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Prior to empirical research on the subject, the tax price elasticity of giving was 
believed to be inelastic. The first econometric study, performed by Taussig, was 
published in 1967 and supported the theory that tax price elasticity was weak and income 
elasticity was strong (Clotfelter, 1985). Research immediately following Taussig’s 
seminal work modeled his methodology but typically refuted his findings (Clotfelter, 
1985). Feldstein (1975), however, formed a pooled time-series that resulted in a price 
elasticity estimate of -1.24 and income elasticity of 0.82, concluding that tax price 
elasticity is greater than previously believed. Subsequent research into the 1980s supports 
Feldstein’s findings. By 1985, the consensus was that tax price of giving is elastic and 
treasury efficient. 
Clotfelter (1985) outlined key issues with the earlier models such as endogeneity 
of tax variables and multicollinearity of price and income. Endogeneity is addressed by 
use of the “first-dollar” measure of tax price, calculated as the marginal tax rate on the 
first dollar donated. Researchers recognized that taxpayers may donate in order to qualify 
for itemization on the tax return. For itemizers who contribute in order to itemize, the 
correct first-dollar price is one (Clotfelter, 1985, p. 89). These “borderline itemizers,” 
taxpayers unable to itemize if no donations were made, are excluded from the regression 
of tax file data. The need for independent verification was first addressed by exploiting 
differences in state income tax rates or changes in federal tax rates over time, and the 
results remained consistent with previous studies (Clotfelter, 1985, p. 81). Other model 
concerns were remedied as well. For example, the measure of giving, the dependent 
variable, is the charitable contribution deduction claimed on the tax return, which is zero 
in the case of nongivers. A common practice that continues today is to add an 
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insignificant sum, such as $1 or $10, to all giving variables to eliminate the $0 variables. 
Several researchers employ a Tobit model to accommodate for zero balance variables 
such as no donations given (Brooks, 2017; Duquette, 1999; Tiehen, 2001). Early models 
are considered “static” as cross-sectional or time-series data are utilized (Barrett, 1991). 
Broman (1989) first transitioned the traditional static model into a “dynamic” model by 
inclusion of lagged and anticipated variables into a first differenced model. Barrett (1991) 
examined the robustness of different models on panel data and determined the preferred 
model was two-way dynamic fixed-effects. 
Nearly fifty years of research has resulted in many advancements on the theory of 
price and elasticity, but not a clear consensus on the precise measure. A meta-analysis 
performed by Peloza and Steel (2005) on 69 empirical studies spanned four decades of 
research. The estimates from the studies varied from an unusual positive elasticity of 0.12 
to a highly negative elasticity of -7.07 (Peloza & Steel, 2005, p. 261). In the meta-
analysis, the weighted mean of the price elasticity of giving was -1.44 with a standard 
deviation of 1.21. When outliers (more than three standard deviations from the mean) 
were removed, the weighted average fell to -1.11 (Peloza & Steel, 2005, p. 265), 
supporting the theory of elasticity.  
Data sets used in research. 
Early regression research on tax price elasticity was dependent on the limited data 
available. The two basic data sources were cross-sectional data from individual tax 
returns of itemizers and household surveys (Clotfelter 1985). As panel data became 
readily available, researchers were able to adapt methodologies. Panel data sets are more 
persuasive by reducing omission of relevant variables, allowing price and income effects 
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to be distinguishable, and permitting dynamic effects, such as timing, to be measured 
(Barrett, McGuirek, & Steinberg, 1997, p. 322; Steinberg, 1990, p. 71). Researchers 
theorized that panel data obtained lower elasticities (Steinberg, 1990). However, Peloza 
and Steel (2005) did not find support in their meta-analysis for the theory of lower price 
elasticities with studies based on panel data as compared to studies based on cross-
sectional data. More recent research primarily employs regression analysis on panel data 
sets of individual taxpayer returns, but not exclusively. 
Greater use of tax data is not an indication of superiority over survey data. 
Clotfelter (1985) noted the largest price elasticities were found using 1973 survey data (-
2.10 to -2.54) and aggregate tax return data appeared to be less reliable since more 
variety (-0.42 to -1.34) was found in research based on that source. Clotfelter (1985) and 
Duquette (2016) summarized concerns about systematic reporting errors that can be 
present in both sets, including overstating of donations by itemizers to evade tax and 
understating of donations by non-itemizers due to lack of recordkeeping. Hurst, Li, and 
Pugsley found tax evaders did not provide truthful responses on household surveys either 
(as cited in Duquette, 2016, p. 53). Overstatements of donations can suppress elasticity 
estimates and Peloza and Steel (2005) found support in their meta-analysis that tax data 
generated lower price elasticities (mean of -1.08) than survey data price elasticity 
estimates (mean of -1.29). However, by examining audited as compared to unaudited tax 
data, Clotfelter (1985) found overstatement of deductions did not lead to systematic bias 
of the price effect (p. 92). The meta-analysis failed to find support that audited tax data 
generated lower price elasticities than unaudited tax data, confirming previous findings 
(Peloza & Steel, 2005, p. 267). 
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While taxpayer data is often considered more reliable, survey data can provide a 
richer breadth of information. Potentially relevant variables are not present in tax data 
such as wealth measurements, non-itemizer donations, and contribution destinations. 
Researchers have attempted to use a proxy for wealth such as interest and dividend 
income (Lin & Lo, 2012) and, as discussed below, a short window of tax reform created 
taxpayer data for non-itemizers. Individual taxpayer returns do not provide any variable 
to determine the charity receiving monetary donations. Until recently, researchers 
attempting to estimate price elasticity by nonprofit sector relied exclusively on household 
survey data. A limited number of studies beginning in 2013 used tax data from the 
recipient charitable organizations through their Internal Revenue Service (IRS) Form 
990, the information return of public charities and private foundations. In theory, the 
contribution measure includes all monetary gifts from all income groups and both 
itemizers and non-itemizers. The empirical research findings are discussed in a following 
section of this paper, but the relatively new data set has yet to receive widespread 
acceptance. 
Empirical research areas of concentration. 
Anticipated, transitory, and persistent changes. 
After comparing actual giving to predicted giving based on the traditional 
regression model for the 1979 to 1990 time period, Auten, et al. (1992) identified several 
limitations of the traditional model. The traditional model does not account for 
expectations about future price and income measures, does not distinguish between 
transitory and persistent tax price changes, and assumes that transitory and persistent 
income changes will elicit the same response from all taxpayers (Auten et al., 1992). 
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Anticipation of changes may cause taxpayers to shift giving across tax periods, causing 
an appearance of a change in the level of giving but is instead only a change in the timing 
of giving. Elasticity estimates are exaggerated if time shifting is ignored (Barrett et al., 
1997). The responses may also differ depending on whether the change is transitory or 
persistent. Persistent tax price changes resulted from the 1981 and 1986 tax reforms and 
transitory tax price changes occurred with the phase-in of marginal tax rate reductions 
during reform (Auten, Sieg, & Clotfelter, 2002, p. 374).  
The first empirical study to give evidence that anticipation of price changes 
impacts giving was published by Broman (1989), capitalizing on the significant tax rate 
reductions of the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981. Whereas previous research 
considered the giving of subjects in different tax brackets, thus different tax prices of 
giving, Broman shifted the focus to how giving behavior changes when price changes. 
Using the first differenced model, price and income elasticities were estimated with data 
on changes. The result was much smaller price elasticity than provided by the traditional 
model. Broman (1989) concluded that contributions were much more sensitive to an 
anticipated future price change than to the current price of giving. Although Clotfelter 
(1985) first theorized the traditional model estimates long-run elasticity and the first 
difference model estimates short-run elasticity, Broman’s research eliminated many of 
the weaknesses in his modified model. Randolph (1995) used a two-way random effects 
model and included measures for expected future income and expected future tax price. 
The results imply taxpayers substitute current giving and future giving to exploit 
transitory tax price changes (Randolph, 1995, p. 735). Barrett et al. (1997) built on 
Broman’s (1989) dynamic model by including lagged giving to measure habit persistence 
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and lagged and future income variables to measure consumption smoothing. With a 
similar model but including local and state tax rates in the price and a panel covering a 
longer timeframe, Bakija and Heim (2011) found taxpayers altered donations in advance 
to large obvious future changes in federal marginal tax rates but found less conclusive 
evidence of the response to more subtle sources of future price changes (p. 618). 
Auten et al. (2002) found little supporting evidence of an impact from past or 
future prices but concluded that persistent changes had substantially larger impact on 
giving than transitory changes. These findings counter Randolph’s (1995) conclusion that 
persistent price elasticity is smaller in absolute value (less than unity) than transitory 
price elasticity (greater than unity). He argued that by not separately measuring 
permanent and transitory income, previous research overestimated the effect of 
permanent price changes (Randolph, 1995, p. 735). The income measure was 
traditionally determined to be adjusted gross income less federal income tax assuming no 
donations. However, Friedman theorized as early as 1957 that normal, not actual, levels 
of income should be used and Feldstein and Clotfelter introduced a multi-year average 
for the income variable in 1976 (as cited in Clotfelter, 1985, p.55). Subsequent studies 
differed in how the income variable is measured, using either current income or, for 
example, an average of multiple years to determine permanent income (Brooks, 2007). In 
an effort to reduce omitted variable bias, Bakija and Heim (2011) incorporated local and 
state tax rates into the tax price measure which allowed observations of taxpayers with 
the same income but different tax prices, finding persistent price elasticity greater than 
unity. Table 1.1 provides an overview of the transitory verses persistent tax price 
elasticities estimates. 
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Table 1.1 
 
Tax price elasticities of giving – transitory verses persistent 
Publication Transitory Persistent 
   
Broman (1989) -0.22 to -0.28 -0.32 to -0.41 
Clotfelter (1985)  -0.24 to -0.94 -0.45 to -1.55 
Barrett et al. (1997)  -0.47 
Randolph (1995) -1.55 -0.51 
Auten et al. (2002)  -0.04 to -0.61 -0.79 to -1.26 
Bakija & Heim (2011) -0.78 to -0.80 -1.53 to -1.40 
Brooks (2007)  -2.70 
Brooks (2017)  -3.00 
 
Non-itemizers’ elasticity. 
A significant limitation to elasticity estimates based on individual taxpayer data is 
exclusion of non-itemizers. By focusing only on itemizers, the tax price elasticity is 
potentially overstated and results in exaggerated estimates of tax reform impact on 
charitable contributions (Backus & Grant, 2018). In most years, non-itemizers have a tax 
price of one since they receive no tax benefit from a charitable contribution. The 
Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 briefly provided an “above the line” charitable 
contribution deduction for non-itemizers. The deduction was limited in the first four 
years (25% of the first $100 of gifts in 1982 and 1983, 25% of the first $300 of gifts in 
1984, 50% of all gifts in 1985), without limits (all gifts fully deductible) in 1986, and 
expired in 1987. According to Duquette (1999), the first study using the 1980s tax data to 
specifically estimate non-itemizer giving was inconclusive due to large standard errors (p. 
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197). Dunbar and Phillips (1997) used cross-sectional data and, while admitting to 
omitted variables bias and high multicollinearity, found the tax price primarily impacted 
the decision to give but not the level of giving. Using ordinary least squares on panel data 
of non-itemizers, Dunbar and Phillips (1997) estimated a highly elastic (-3.356) tax price 
supporting the theory that the non-itemizer deduction is treasury efficient. Dunbar and 
Phillips (1997) concluded that the reduced tax price of giving induced non-itemizers to 
increase giving in 1986 and induced 1985 non-givers to become givers in 1986. Duquette 
(1999) employed Tobit regression on the same data set but included itemizers as a 
comparison. He not only found giving was less price elastic for non-itemizers (-0.637) as 
compared to itemizers (-1.241), but also disputed previous findings that the non-itemizer 
deduction was treasury efficient (Duquette, 1999). Meta-analysis findings do not support 
the hypothesis that itemizers have higher price elasticities than non-itemizers (Peloza & 
Steel, 2005). With the limited empirical research available, it is difficult to confidently 
state a consensus regarding the tax price elasticity of the non-itemizer deduction. 
Income classes and giving-size classes. 
Several studies considered the possibility of varying price elasticities between 
different classes of taxpayers such as income classes or giving classes. Clotfelter’s (1985) 
literature review reflected no firm conclusion that price elasticity varies by income class. 
Research suggests higher income groups have greater price elasticity, but the limited 
examination of low-income levels prevents precise determination of the variety 
(Clotfelter, 1985, p. 71). Using a regression model that includes a measure of permanent 
income on a ten-year panel sample of individual taxpayers, Auten et al. (1992) predicted 
giving by income class and compared the results to reported giving. The findings 
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suggested highest income taxpayers were more sensitive to tax price changes. O’Neil, 
Steinberg, and Thompson estimated price elasticities form a U-shape pattern based on 
income class, where the more elastic income groups were the lowest and highest classes 
(as cited by Lin & Lo, 2012, p. 547). Greenwood concluded the elasticity of high-income 
groups was less elastic than low income groups (as cited by Lin & Lo, 2012, p. 549). 
Bakija and Heim (2011) did not find evidence that persistent price elasticities differed 
substantially across income classes (p. 642). It appears a 1977 statement by Zellner still 
holds, “Simply put, the price elasticities for different income groups have not been 
determined very precisely” (as cited by Clotfelter, 1985, p. 71). 
Using censored quantile regression, Lin and Lo (2012) considered price elasticity 
variance based on level of giving. Literature addressing the reasons donors give offer 
theories reflecting the size of gifts. Reinstein posits large givers are more committed to 
charitable giving and, thus, less price elastic and Smith, Kehoe, and Cremer believe 
altruistic givers will always give something (as cited by Lin & Lo, 2012, p. 537). Lin and 
Lo (2012) provided empirical evidence that donors at lower giving quantiles are price 
elastic but donors at higher giving quantiles are price inelastic. Following common 
practice, the study only included itemizers and, as a result, may not properly reflect lower 
giving quantiles. In addition, the study used cross-sectional data, preventing the 
separation of persistent and transitory changes. Additional research is needed before a 
consensus about these results can be reached. 
Elasticity variance within the nonprofit sector. 
Various research considers elasticity of giving within the nonprofit sector. Most 
of this research relies on household survey data since individual taxpayer returns provide 
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little to no information about the destination of charitable contributions. The earliest 
studies agree that elasticities do vary by nonprofit sector but do not agree on the elasticity 
estimates.  Feldstein (1975) found giving to religious organizations was inelastic but 
estimated the price elasticity for private education organizations to be highly elastic. 
Reece (1979) found the opposite, estimating religious giving to be elastic while private 
education elasticity was only about -0.08. Bradley, Holden, and McClelland (1999) 
supported the view that religious giving had very low elasticity, especially when 
compared to social welfare organizations. Brooks (2007) estimated elasticities greater 
than unity for each religious, educational, and social welfare organizations. The most 
recent studies using 2009 survey data estimated higher elasticity. Brooks (2017) found 
both religious and secular giving to be highly elastic, well above unity, and religious 
giving to be more elastic than giving to secular organizations. Zampelli and Yen (2017) 
estimated elasticity between -1.42 to -2.72 depending on charity. Hungerman and Ottoni-
Wilhelm (2016) obtained donation data from a nationally-recognized university and, 
based on state tax credit eligibility for in-state donors, found a tax price elasticity 
between -0.121 and -0.293. 
As discussed in a prior section of this paper, there are a limited number of studies 
estimating elasticities from information returns of charitable organizations submitted to 
the IRS. Using the Form 990 allows the researcher to capture all donations recognized by 
specific tax-exempt entities and to categorize giving by sector. Yetman and Yetman 
(2013) published the first extensive study estimating elasticity for 24 types of nonprofits. 
Seven sectors, including private education, had high price elasticity averaging -2.3 while 
the remaining types were inelastic, with estimates not significantly different from zero 
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(Yetman & Yetman, 2013). Duquette (2016) found elasticities ranging from -2.5 to -5.0 
depending on the sector and found evidence that larger organizations had higher 
elasticities than smaller nonprofits. Duquette interpreted the findings as “illuminating 
previously unobservable heterogeneity across charities” instead of a contradiction to 
previous research results of much smaller elasticities (Duquette, 2016, 68). 
Using the education sector as an example, Table 2.1 illustrates the variance found 
in the tax price elasticity estimates. 
Table 2.1 
Private education sector tax price elasticities of giving 
Publication Education Higher 
education 
   
Reece (1979) -0.08  
Yetman & Yetman (2013) -1.01  
Brooks (2007)  -1.18  
Feldstein (1975) -2.23  
Duquette (2016) -2.90 -2.54 
Hungerman & Ottoni-Wilhelm (2016)  -0.20 
 
Elasticity of charitable bequests. 
Most research focuses on inter-vivos giving and limited attention is given to 
charitable bequests. Estates are subject to different tax rates than individual income and 
are allowed unlimited charitable contribution deductions. While only a small percentage 
of estates are subject to the estate tax and only a small percentage of those subject to the 
tax include bequests, the impact of tax policy on estates is important to charitable 
organizations that significantly benefit from bequests, often in the form of endowments. 
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The model for estate tax price elasticity estimates is similar to the traditional model for 
individual giving with the exception that estate size is measured instead of disposable 
income. Peloza and Steel’s (2005) meta-analysis examined the eight available empirical 
research studies to test the hypothesis that tax price is more elastic for bequests than other 
forms of giving. Results from the meta-analysis supported the theory and found the 
difference in the means (-1.50 for bequest estimates as compare to -1.18 for other forms 
of donations) was considerable (p. 267). The limited research on bequests prevents 
widely accepted consensus, however Clotefelter (1985) identified three basic conclusions 
that still hold today: (a) bequests are subject to tax-induced price effects in the same 
manner as inter-vivos giving, (b) tax price is more elastic for larger estates than smaller 
estates, and (c) bequest research results are not as robust as individual giving research 
results (p. 249).  
Summary. 
Fifty years after the first empirical study of the tax price elasticity of giving there 
are significant advancements in the theoretical framework and methodology, but not in 
refined estimates. The inaugural theory was of relatively inelastic tax price, however 
regression analysis soon refuted that theory. Since that time, the prevailing theory has 
been that the tax price is elastic, but questions remain concerning treasury efficiency. 
Panel data sets, persistent and transitory measures, and theories surrounding time-shifting 
and lagging responses altered belief in the strength of the elasticity. Studies on persistent 
verses transitory changes and elasticity variance between taxpayer or donor classes are 
likely to be extended. Other areas, such as the elasticity of non-itemizers, suffer from 
limited recent data availability to allow further exploration. A promising area for future 
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study on tax price elasticity is the relatively recent use of IRS Form 990 data. While 
considerable progress has been made, the debate continues in the quest to find a precise 
estimate of tax price elasticity. 
Tax Policy Effect 
Limited research centered on the tax policy effect of higher education 
endowments is available. This section reviews literature that employed simulations based 
on either enacted or proposed legislation. A brief discussion of private foundation 
research is included. Private foundations have an operational likeness to endowments and 
are subject to significant tax regulation similar to both proposed and newly enacted 
legislation, such as the net investment income tax on private university endowments. 
Simulations with enacted tax reform. 
The tax reforms of the 1980s provided an opportunity to assess tax price elasticity 
models with implemented tax policies. As Clotfelter (1990) highlighted, models are not 
expected to accurately predict the future if omitted variables change, for example the 
stock market crash of October 1987. The simulations of the 1980s largely pointed to 
giving was reasonably consistent with the model predictions, but contributions reported 
by the nonprofit sector did increase. Ricketts and Westfall (1993) made predictions for 
1983 and 1985 based on the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 and found significant 
underestimates in both years using the traditional tax price elasticity model but a very 
slight overestimate with a random coefficients regression model. Auten et al. (1992) 
found high-income taxpayers reduced giving by less than predicted but, as expected, the 
taxpayers with the largest change in tax price demonstrated the greatest effect. Average 
contributions, however, increased even as the tax laws made it less beneficial to give 
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(Auten et al., 1992). Clotfelter’s (1990) simulation predicted a surge in contributions in 
1986 relative to 1987, decreased giving in 1988, and even larger drops in appreciated 
property gifts after 1986. Higher education institutions did experience the predicted 
fluctuations and, in addition, Clotfelter (1990) found income classes with the largest tax 
price increases decreased contributions with the highest-income donors giving smaller 
shares of total contributions. These simulations were limited by the lack of data with 
samples of itemizer tax return information only. 
 Simulations of proposed tax reform. 
Gravelle and Marples (2010) analyzed an itemized deduction cap proposal for the 
2011 federal budget which had an expected 19.2% increase in tax price for taxpayers in 
the highest tax bracket. The analysis predicted a .28% decrease in overall giving 
assuming low tax-price elasticity, 1.44% decrease with moderate elasticity, and 2.27% 
decrease with high elasticity (Gravelle & Marples, 2010). Cordes (2011) simulated the 
potential effects of a 28 percent cap for the maximum rate at which all charitable 
contributions are deductible and disaggregated the simulated changes by different types 
of charitable causes including higher education. To simulate the change, Cordes (2011) 
estimated the impact on charitable contributions reported by the Internal Revenue 
Service’s Statistics of Income Division assuming two scenarios: (1) the price elasticity of 
giving is -0.5 and (2) the price elasticity of giving is -1.0. Cordes (2011) found total 
contributions for giving to “education” will decrease by 2.3 to 3.5 percent if the price 
elasticity is -0.5 and by 4.4 to 13.8 percent when price elasticity is assumed to be -1.0. 
(Note the category of “education” includes, but not exclusively, higher education.) 
Cordes (2011) also used data on income class giving patterns collected from two 
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household surveys, the Center on Philanthropy Panel Study and the Bank of America 
Study of High Net Worth Philanthropy, to disaggregate the change in giving across the 
different types of charitable causes. The effect on the nonprofit finances was then 
demonstrated by contextualizing the reduction in contributions within the framework of 
total revenues. Cordes (2011) applied an assumed ten percent decrease in contributions to 
28 major groups of nonprofits, an assumption that was in the upper range of projected 
reductions. By determining the percentage of revenue generated by contributions, Cordes 
(2011) calculated the percentage reduction in total revenue caused by the assumed ten 
percent loss in contributions. A theoretical ten percent drop in contributions reduced the 
revenues of higher education nonprofits 1.4 percent (Cordes, 2011). This measure is an 
estimate for a single year inclusive of all types of giving – expendable for current year 
operations as well as nonexpendable for endowment building. 
One of the few studies specific to university endowments examined theoretical 
tax policies and calculated impact if enacted. Milton and Ehrenberg (2014) simulated 
three proposed tax policies assuming implementation in 1992 and compared the 
simulated mean university endowment size to actual mean endowment size in 2010. A 
minimum spending rule similar to the rule applicable to private foundations, discussed in 
the following section, would increase the average annual payouts from endowments, but 
eventually decreases endowment size and subsequent payouts (Milton & Ehrenberg, 
2014). A tax on endowments over $1 billion impacts a limited number of institutions. 
Milton and Ehrenberg (2014) estimated a 4.8% reduction in endowment size by the end 
of the time period with a 2.5% tax. Policies were simulated related directly to charitable 
contribution deductions, elimination of all deductions to university endowments and 
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reducing deductions to one-half of the contribution. Milton and Ehrenberg (2014) found 
eliminating or reducing charitable deduction gifts would decrease endowment 
distributions by 12.8% at the end of the time period, with the variance between quartiles 
ranging from a reduction of 11.5% to a reduction 15.3%. Elimination of the tax deduction 
was projected to reduce endowment distributions by 25.7%, with any reduction in the 
deduction hurting small-endowed schools the greatest, assuming all donors are in top 
marginal tax rate with a tax-price elasticity of -1.0 (Milton & Ehrenberg, 2014).  
Policy implications for private foundations. 
Private foundations are able to grant a tax benefit to a donor years before the gift 
generates a charitable benefit, much like university endowments. Transfer of today’s 
wealth to the future’s beneficiaries creates “current charitable contribution deductions to 
donors and future virtually tax-exempt investment returns” until ultimately being granted 
to a public charity (Sansing & Yetman, 2006, p. 364). This charitable benefit lag is 
frequently cited as justification for the minimum distribution requirement for private 
foundations. Levine and Sansing (2013) stated the minimum distribution requirement was 
a political compromise to the lifespan debate of private foundations – the question of 
being permitted to have a perpetual or limited time existence. There is no comparative 
advantage, according to Levine and Sansing (2013), to establish a private foundation 
instead of providing funding to an existing public charity except for “a desire to retain 
control of foundation assets” (p. 167). 
Private foundations face more restrictive regulation than public charities. The Tax 
Reform Act of 1969 established a minimum distribution requirement and an excise tax on 
net investment income for private foundations. Although the tax regulations have been 
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amended to reduce the rates, the basic structure is still in effect. Tax law requires private 
foundations to disburse a minimum of five percent of the monthly average fair market 
value of non-charitable use endowment assets each year. Foundations readily comply 
with the required distribution in order to maintain tax-exempt status, but frequently only 
distribute an immaterial amount above the minimum required. In a study of private 
foundation distributions, Sansing and Yetman (2006) approximated 57% of distributions 
were targeted or benchmarked to the minimum required, indicating the majority of 
foundations were limiting distribution decisions based on the tax code regulation. 
Foundations distributing more than the minimum required tended to be active 
foundations that were continuing to receive new donations and experiencing asset growth 
(Sansing & Yetman, 2006).  
Sansing and Yetman (2006) found most foundations did not manage distributions 
for the dual excise tax advantage. Large and professionally managed foundations are 
timing distributions to qualify for the reduced tax rate, however those institutions also 
had lower five-year average distribution percentages (Sansing & Yetman, 2006). 
Congress’ incentive to stimulate spending for charitable purposes creates a disincentive 
to distribute funds beyond the minimum required. Sansing and Yetman (2006) concluded 
the IRS regulations on distributions are effective on inert foundations but constrain 
activity of growing foundations. 
Summary. 
Impact of tax policy is evaluated by simulations of previously-enacted reform and 
proposed reform. Tax regulations imposed on private foundations are informative for 
university endowments as similar legislation has been recently enacted. Private, higher 
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education institutions with at least 500 tuition-paying students and non-charitable-use 
assets of $500,000 per student are now subject to an excise tax of 1.4% on net investment 
income (U.S. House, 2017), very similar to the net investment income tax imposed on 
private foundations. Theoretical model predications cannot capture all the relevant 
variables but, for higher education, research supports the efficacy of the tax-price 
elasticity models. 
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Chapter 3: Methodology 
 
This chapter introduces the research questions, hypotheses, and methodologies 
used for this dissertation. Two research questions are addressed: the first question 
examines the overarching impact of tax policy on university endowments and the second 
question narrows the application of the findings. The methodology used to answer each 
question and the population samples, variables, and sources of the datasets are described. 
The final item discussed in this chapter is the identified limitations of the study. 
Research Questions and Hypotheses 
Research question 1: What is the long-run financial impact of a tax policy 
proposal that changes the tax price of giving on endowments of higher education 
institutions? 
Tax price elasticity research theorizes that tax policy proposals affect 
contributions to charitable organizations when the tax price of giving is altered, reducing 
gifts provided if the price increases. Unlike expendable gifts, a reduction in endowment 
contributions has a long-run effect because a gift to an endowment can benefit all 
subsequent years. Each year following a contribution, investment income earned on the 
original gift is available for spending. Benefits escalate over time in amount, assuming 
the value of the original gift continues to grow. It is hypothesized that the financial 
impact of the most recent changes enacted in the federal tax code will be minimal to 
university endowments initially but grow to material levels over time as the accumulated 
effect of lower contributions erodes the wealth base and leads to lower future earnings. 
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Research question 2: What institutional characteristics identify institutions with 
greater relevance to personal income tax policies measured by higher reliance on 
individual giving to university endowments? 
University endowments receive contributions from a variety of sources: 
individuals including alumni and parents, foundations, corporations, and other 
organizations. The tax policy examined in the first research question directly impacts 
individuals. Foundations, corporations, and other organizations are subject to their own 
tax policies. The results of the first research question will have greater applicability to 
institutions with heavier reliance on individual donors to the endowment as compared to 
organizational donors. I hypothesize heavier reliance on individual donors to 
endowments is correlated with private colleges, non-doctoral universities, lower full-time 
equivalent enrollment, fewer Pell Grant recipients, and higher published tuition and fees. 
Data Collection 
The population of interest includes all public and private colleges and universities, 
including affiliated foundations, in the U.S. that hold endowment assets. For-profit higher 
education institutions are excluded as charitable contributions are not eligible for tax 
deduction and, therefore, would not be subject to a similar impact of personal income tax 
policy. Data are drawn from three sources: the CASE Voluntary Support of Education 
Survey Data Miner (VSE) database, the NACUBO Survey of Endowments, and the 
National Center for Education Statistics (NCES) Integrated Postsecondary Education 
Data System (IPEDS). The primary source, the VSE survey, is a voluntary survey 
completed by North American educational institutions, including higher education, and 
provides variables related to charitable giving and fundraising from private sources 
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(CASE, 2019a). Invitations to participate in the survey are mailed and e-mailed to 
approximately 3,800 institutions. Any U.S. institution that does not receive an invitation 
may request to participate and will be included. CASE (2019a) reports that approximately 
one-third of the U.S. colleges and universities respond to the survey and represent close 
to 80% of total voluntary support in higher education. Response rates are lowest among 
two-year institutions, smaller colleges, and institutions that experienced a weak previous 
year. Participation is highest by doctoral universities. NACUBO (2019b) published 
annual reports, jointly with the Commonfund Institute from 2009 to 2017 as the 
NACUBO-Commonfund Survey of Endowments (NCSE) and with the TIAA beginning 
in 2018 as the NTSE. Endowment performance and management practices in higher 
education were voluntarily provided by U.S. colleges and universities for the NACUBO 
Endowment Study, NCSE, and NTSE (NACUBO, 2019a). Participation size and 
composition is similar to the VSE and is completed by on online questionnaire with a 
subsequent detailed telephone call interview (NACUBO, 2018). Reporting to IPEDS is 
required for all higher education institutions that participate in federal student financial 
aid programs and the surveys provide information about institutional characteristics, 
outcomes, demographics, and financial data (NCES, 2019a). The IPEDS data include all 
intuitions that voluntarily complete the surveys compiled by VSE and NACUBO. Tables 
A.1 and A.2 in the Appendix provide reporting institutions by summarized Carnegie 
Classification for fiscal year 2017. The NCES and the VSE represent similar populations, 
but overrepresent doctoral, master’s, and baccalaureate institutions of the U.S. higher 
education population. For institutions reporting endowment balances, the surveys are 
more closely aligned but significantly underrepresent two-year and special focus four-
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year colleges. Doctoral universities continue to be overrepresented. Tables A.3 and A.4 
reflect institutions reporting endowment balances by institutional control. Private 
institutions and larger endowment balances are overrepresented, especially in the NCSE. 
I discuss the samples for each research question and study limitations in the subsequent 
sections of this chapter. 
Research Question 1 
Description of method 
As documented by Milton and Ehrenberg (2013), endowment values are changed 
by more than contributions alone. A loss in contributions in one year has cumulating 
effects in subsequent years as earning opportunities are forgone. By inserting the effect of 
a tax price change into Milton and Ehrenberg’s endowment growth formula, the financial 
impact of the change is estimated over the long-run. Milton and Ehrenberg (2013) 
provided the basic relationship of the components similar to the following (slight 
adjustments were made to reflect ending endowment balances employed in place of 
beginning endowment balances): 
7%' = 	7%,'8,(1 +	
:%'
7%,'8,
)(1 +	;%')(1 −	=%'),	 
where: 
 7%' =  size of institution i’s endowment at the end of period t 
 :%' =  annual gifts to endowment 
 ;%' =  rate of return on endowment assets 
 =%' =  endowment spending rate 
Endowment growth is achieved by annual gifts to the endowment and the return on the 
endowment investment assets. Gifts and return both increase the nonexpendable 
59 
	
(principal) portion of the endowment and return provides the expendable (earnings) 
portion of the endowment. Return can also decrease the nonexpendable portion of the 
endowment during economic downturns through losses, both realized and unrealized. 
Spending from the endowment decreases the expendable portion of the endowment.  
To assert the implications of a change in tax policy, inclusion of a variable to 
reflect the estimated decrease in annual giving is needed. The variable reflects the 
product of the tax price of giving elasticity and the percentage change in the tax price of 
giving. The tax price of giving is 1 – m where m is the marginal tax rate. For donors in 
the 25 percent tax bracket, each dollar claimed as a charitable contribution deduction 
reduces the tax liability by 25 cents, resulting in a tax price of giving of 75 cents per 
dollar donated. Responsiveness to changes in the tax price of giving is measured by the 
elasticity – the percentage change in donations resulting from a one percentage change in 
the price of giving, all else being equal. Price elasticity of giving is believed to be 
negative; an increase in tax price causes a decrease in giving (Clotfelter, 1985). The 
composition of the change in contributions variable is expressed as follows: 
>' = 	?'(
(,8	@A)8(,8	@B)
(,8	@B)
), 
where: 
 >' = change in contributions in period t 
 ?' = tax price elasticity of giving in period t 
 CD = marginal tax rate pre-implementation of the new tax policy 
 C, = marginal tax rate post-implementation of the new tax policy 
Without the change in contributions variable, the equation approximates actual 
endowment levels for each year. The addition of the variable estimates endowment levels 
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for each year assuming a tax policy results in a change to the tax price of giving. The 
addition of the new variable results in the following: 
7%' = 	7%,'8,(1 +	
(,EFG)HIG
JI,GKA
)(1 +	;%')(1 −	=%'). 
The coefficient to the annual gifts to endowment variable increases annual gifts in years 
of tax price reduction and decreases annual gifts in years of tax price escalations. The 
relationships are summarized as follows: 
Marginal Tax Rate Tax Price of Giving Change in Giving 1 + >' 
 ↓ ↑ ↓ < 1 
 ↑ ↓ ↑ > 1 
For an example application of the new coefficient, assume a tax price elasticity, 
?', of      -1.1. If the marginal tax rate pre-implementation of a new tax policy, CD, is 0.35 
and post-implementation, C,, is 0.3, there is a 0.077 increase in the tax price. The 
product of the increase in tax price and ?' is -0.085, the change in contributions, >'. The 
coefficient 1 + >' is now 0.915, reducing annual gifts to endowments, :%'. If the previous 
example was a 0.077 decrease in the tax price, >' is calculated as 0.085, the resulting 
value for the coefficient 1 + >' is 1.085, and annual gifts are increased. By using data 
from a selected time period, the approximate endowment levels at the end of that time 
period are compared to the estimates of endowment levels based on an assumed change 
in tax price. The difference between the approximation and the estimate is a financial 
measure of the impact on higher education endowments. By quantifying the impact, a 
measure is developed that encompasses all components generating endowment growth, 
not just contributions. 
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Variables 
The first research question engages five continuous variables in a formula to 
predict endowment ending fair market value (FMV). Each of the variables used in the 
prediction model is described in the following sections. 
Endowment fair market value. 
The VSE survey collects the endowment FMV at the end of each fiscal year. 
Survey instructions direct participants to include true, term, and quasi-endowment funds 
and public institutions to include endowment from affiliated foundations (CASE, 2018). 
The variable is identified as the ending FMV for year 0, but also represents the beginning 
FMV for year 1. For example, to predict the endowment ending FMV for 2008, the 
ending FMV for 2007 is used as the beginning FMV for 2008. While this is the variable 
the study attempts to predict, the actual values are used to begin the prediction and to 
measure the accuracy of the model. 
Charitable contributions to endowment. 
Charitable contributions to endowment were extracted from the VSE survey for 
each institution and each year of the study. All outright gifts to the endowment for the 
specified year are reflected in this variable. Gifts to endowment are added to the corpus 
and may be in the form of cash or investments. In either case, the contribution is valued 
based on market value on the date of the gift. Variables also provide the subclassification 
of income-restricted verses income-unrestricted endowment gifts. Income-restricted gifts 
specify purpose, time, or purpose and time requirements on the income generated by the 
endowment gift. Income-unrestricted gifts provide the institution discretion in the use of 
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income subsequently earned from the endowment gift. No distinction between restricted 
and unrestricted endowment gifts is made in this dissertation. 
Endowment investment rate of return. 
Annual investment return data are not available for each institution, however the 
NCSE compiled a summary of the reported one-year return averages, net of fees, each 
year and provided an average for each endowment size segment based on the value of the 
endowment assets at the end of the year. I use the NCSE reported average rates for the 
investment return as determined by the endowment FMV variable for each institution in 
each year. The six asset size segments, listed below, were interpreted to round to the 
nearest $100,000 applied as follows:  
1. Over $1 billion > $1,000,000,000 
2. Between $501 million and $1 billion $500,500,000 ≤ 
$1,000,000,000 
3. Between $101 million and $500 million $100,500,000 ≤ 
$500,499,999 
4. Between $51 million and $100 million $50,500,000 ≤ $100,499,999 
5. Between $25 million and $50 million $25,000,000 ≤ $50,499,999 
6. Under $25 million < $25,000,000 
The NACUBO Endowment Study and the NCSE were voluntary and the number 
of institutions and the specific participants varied across time. Over the ten-year period 
examined in this dissertation, the NACUBO Endowment Study and NCSE samples 
averaged 824 institutions and fluctuated from a low in 2005 of 796 to a high of 850 in 
2010 (NACUBO, 2019b). Lerner et al. (2008) noted the data in the Endowment Study 
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tended to be from larger and more selective universities and were more likely to be 
private institutions. A strength in the data noted by Brown et al. (2010) is that the 
institutions included in the sample were not added or removed for any previous years’ 
results which eliminated survivorship or self-selection bias. Barber and Wang (2013) 
quantitatively supported the theory that survivorship bias is not a concern due to the 
longevity of educational institutions and their endowments. This dissertation’s sample 
includes the same 648 institutions across all years. The 2017 NCSE had a slightly larger 
sample of 809 U.S. higher education institutions and included 484 (74.7%) institutions of 
this dissertation’s sample. Table 3.1 summarizes and compares the frequency of 
institutions and distribution of endowment FMVs by ten-year average endowment size 
segments for each sample. Table 3.2 summarizes and compares the frequency of 
institutions and distribution of endowment FMV by institutional control for each sample 
for the last five years of the study, the only years available for the published NCSE. The 
endowment FMVs in Tables 3.1 and 3.2 have not been inflation-adjusted to maintain 
consistent grouping with assigned rates of return. The similarity of the samples’ 
compositions supports the application of the NCSE reported average rates to this 
dissertation. 
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Table 3.1 
 
Frequency Distribution and Endowment FMV of Institutions, Ten-year average (2008-
17) 
Endowment 
FMV  
($ in 
billions) 
Dissertation 
Sample 
Frequency 
(%) 
NACUBO/NCSE 
Sample 
Frequency (%) 
Dissertation 
Sample 
Endowment 
FMV (%) 
NACUBO/NCSE 
Sample 
Endowment FMV 
(%) 
Over 
$1 71 (11.0) 78 (9.5) $309.0 (75.6) $321.3 (72.0) 
$.5 to 
≤ $1 
59 (9.1) 71 (8.6) $43.1 (10.6) $49.5 (11.1) 
$.1 to 
≤ $.5 
179 (27.6) 250 (30.3) $42.9 (10.5) $57.0 (12.8) 
$.05 to 
≤ $.1 
115 (17.7) 164 (19.9) $8.4 (2.0) $11.9 (2.7) 
$.025 
to  
≤ $.05 
101 (15.6) 128 (15.6) $3.9 (0.9) $4.7 (1.0) 
Under 
$.025 
123 (19.0) 133 (16.1) $1.6 (0.4) $1.9 (0.4) 
 
 
Table 3.2 
 
Frequency Distribution and Endowment FMV of Institutions, Five-year average (2013-
17) 
Institutional 
Control 
($ in billions) 
Dissertation 
Sample 
Frequency (%) 
NCSE Sample 
Frequency (%) 
Dissertation 
Sample 
Endowment 
FMV (%) 
NCSE Sample 
Endowment 
FMV (%) 
Private 340 (52.5) 517 (63.2) $324 (71.2) $352 (68.3) 
Public 308 (47.5) 301 (36.8) $131 (28.8) $163 (31.7) 
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Endowment spending rate. 
Identical to the endowment investment rate of return noted in the previous 
section, the annual endowment spending rate data are also not available for each 
institution but were compiled and reported by endowment size segments by the NCSE. 
The reported average annual effective spending rates were defined by NACUBO (2018) 
as: 
The distribution for spending divided by the beginning market value (endowment 
value on or around the beginning of the fiscal year), net of any fees or expenses 
for managing and administering the endowment. The distribution for spending is 
the dollar amount withdrawn from the endowment to support the institution’s 
mission. (p. 120)  
This dissertation uses the NCSE reported average rates for the endowment spending rate 
as determined by the endowment FMV variable for each year and institution. Refer to the 
prior section for supporting analysis of applicability to this study’s sample. 
Change in contributions. 
Determination of the change in contributions requires calculation of the change in 
the tax price of giving and identification of the tax price elasticity. The TCJA enacted 
several provisions that indirectly impact the tax benefit of giving, complicating the 
identification of a single change in the tax price. Chapter one outlines the key provisions 
that reduce the tax price of giving through two primary effects: decrease in the number of 
tax return filers electing to itemize deductions (itemizers) and decrease in the marginal 
tax rates. The change in the tax price of giving is determined by the categorization of the 
donor: 
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• Non-itemizer or non-filer who was previously a non-itemizer or non-filer. 
Non-itemizers and non-filers receive no tax benefit from charitable 
contributions. Without a tax deduction, the tax price of giving is equal to 
contribution, or 100%. By remaining a non-itemizer or non-filer, these 
donors have no change in their tax price of giving. 
• Itemizer who was previously a non-itemizer or non-filer. This group is the 
only cohort that experiences a decrease in the tax price of giving with the 
TCJA, moving from a 100% tax price to a tax price of 100% less the 
marginal tax rate. This population is projected to be very small. 
• Non-itemizer or non-filer who was previously an itemizer. Shifting from 
receiving a tax benefit for contributions to receiving no tax benefit 
increases the tax price of giving to 100%. The increase in the size of the 
standard deduction and the loss of various itemized deduction 
opportunities will result in a large population for this category. The change 
in the tax price of giving depends on the marginal tax rate applicable with 
the tax benefit received, which varies based on taxable income. 
• Itemizer who was previously an itemizer. Most donors who continue to 
itemize will experience a slight increase in the tax price of giving with the 
enactment of lower marginal rates. The change in the tax price of giving 
depends on the change in the marginal tax rates. 
Think tanks American Enterprise Institute (AEI) and Urban-Brookings Tax Policy 
Center (TPC) separately published projections of the impact the TCJA will have on 
charitable donations utilizing microsimulation models. AEI and TPC used slightly 
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different approaches but predicted relatively similar decreases in giving, 4% by AEI and 
5% by TPC (Brill & Choe, 2018; Gleckman, 2018). Both studies found the most 
significant change will be in the reduction in itemizers with less impact from the 
reduction in marginal tax rates. The TPC estimated 21 million (56.7%) households will 
stop itemizing and AEI estimated a slightly higher 27.3 million (Brill & Choe, 2018; 
Gleckman, 2018). The AEI study calculated 83% of the expected decrease in giving will 
be due to the increase in the standard deduction and the remaining 17% will be due to the 
lower marginal tax rates (Brill & Choe, 2018).  
The AEI study employs the IUPUI Lilly Family School of Philanthropy Giving 
USA (Giving USA) study to integrate non-itemizer giving data with tax filer data and 
notes “the bulk of charitable giving is driven by high-income individuals” (Brill & Choe, 
2018, p. 4). Prior to TCJA enactment, individual giving was projected to be $296 billion 
in 2018, based on 2017 giving and 3.2% annual growth (Brill & Choe, 2018; Giving 
USA, 2018). AEI used the Open Source Policy Center’s Tax-Calculator release 0.20.1 to 
simulate giving by itemizers with no tax law changes and assumed the understatement as 
compared to the Giving USA projection was due to non-itemizer giving (Brill & Choe, 
2018). AEI also simulated itemizer giving with the tax law changes, assuming a tax-price 
elasticity of -1.0 and an income elasticity of 1.0 (Brill & Choe, 2018). AEI determined 
the TCJA will increase the average tax price of giving for top deciles of taxpayers but 
have little to no impact for taxpayers with adjusted gross income below the median. AEI 
estimated a weighted-average change in the tax price of giving as a 4% increase in a 
static model and a slightly lower increase of 3.85% in a dynamic model that assumes a 
0.3% growth in GDP (Brill & Choe, 2018). 
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TPC (2018) used their Microsimulation Model version 0217-1 to estimate the tax 
benefit of charitable deductions with and without the TCJA enactment. The tax benefit 
was calculated by projecting the number of tax filers with a charitable contribution by 
income class and multiplying the projection by the average tax benefit per income class 
bracket. The marginal tax rates will primarily impact high-income givers who provide the 
largest proportion of gifts measured by dollars. In a previous simulation, TPC (2017) 
used Microsimulation Model version 0718-1 and estimated non-itemizers, while making 
up 90% of tax return filers, contributed 40% of all giving and the remaining 10% of filers 
were itemizers who contributed 60% of all giving. TPC (2017) estimated the overall tax 
price of giving will increase from 79.3 cents to 84.8 cents, a weighted-average increase of 
6.94%. 
Based on the average of the AEI and TPC microsimulation findings, I employ a 
constant 4.5% decrease for the annual percentage change in contribution variable. The 
AEI is recognized as a conservative think tank and the TPC, while labeled as nonpartisan, 
is a joint project between two think tanks that have been viewed as left-leaning. With the 
different methodological approaches and potentially conflicting perspectives, the 
relatively consistent findings provide wider acceptance of the predicted change in 
contributions. 
Categorical variables. 
Variables are used to categorize data for more precise analysis: endowment size 
quartile, relative contribution quartile, and control of institution. All monetary variables 
are inflation-adjusted to 2017 dollar values (U.S. Department of Labor, 2019). Two 
measures of endowment size are used for classification, total endowment FMV and 
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endowment FMV per student. Endowment size quartile based on total FMV is derived by 
calculating the ten-year average of the inflation-adjusted ending endowment FMVs for 
2008 to 2017. Endowment size quartile based on endowment FMV per student is derived 
by using the ten-year average of the inflation-adjusted ending endowment FMVs and the 
ten-year average of full-time equivalent (FTE) student enrollment. The FTE enrollment 
variable is calculated by IPEDS using fall student headcounts reported by the institution 
for both undergraduate and graduate students. The calculation converts part-time students 
into fractions of full-time students and combines the two for a total FTE headcount. 
Conversion rates vary based on the institutional control; a part-time undergraduate is 
equivalent to 0.403543 FTE and a part-time graduate is equivalent to 0.361702 FTE at a 
four-year public institution, 0.392857 FTE undergraduate and 0.382059 FTE graduate at 
a four-year private institution, and 0.335737 FTE undergraduate at a two-year public 
institution (NCES, 2019b). For this study, each institution was then identified as 
belonging to quartiles based on the calculated average and ratio. NACUBO (2019a) noted 
higher dollar-value endowments tended to have higher average spending rates over the 
last decade. Milton and Ehrenberg (2014) found the long-run impact of eliminating or 
reducing charitable contribution deductions would impair lower-endowed schools the 
greatest. A categorical variable to reflect relative contribution levels was derived by 
combining total contributions to endowments over the ten-year period, inflation-adjusted 
to 2017 dollar value, and calculating this total as a percentage of the 2017 endowment 
FMV. The categorical variable is based on the quartile of this measure. Quartile one 
represents institutions with low percentages of contributions to endowment assets. The 
organizational characteristic control of institution classifies each college and university as 
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either a two-year public, four-year public, or private entity. According to NACUBO 
(2019a), public institutions historically averaged lower effective spending rates than 
private institutions. 
Analysis 
Sample selection and data cleaning. 
The population of interest for the first research question encompasses all public 
and private, not-for-profit colleges and universities, including affiliated foundations, in 
the U.S. that hold endowments. The initial sample for this study was from the VSE 
database and included 1,343 U.S. higher education institutions reporting endowment 
balances during fiscal years 2007 to 2017. The longitudinal study necessitates all 
variables reported for each of the years in the study. Institutions missing at least one year 
of endowment data were removed, eliminating 673 colleges and universities. Two 
institutions were removed due to inconsistency in reporting as combined or separate 
between years and databases (Moravian College and Moravian Seminary). A third 
institution (Salisbury University) was removed for reporting a negative gift in 2008. 
While there is the possibility that a gift may have been returned or a correction was made 
for misapplying the gift to the endowment, the negative gift is not consistent with the 
reporting in IPEDS and is potentially an erroneous entry. West Kentucky Community and 
Technical College reported an unusual series of gifts and balances from 2015 to 2017. 
The institution reported endowment ending FMV balances around $300,000 for each of 
the years. However, contributions to endowment of approximately $655,000 were 
reported in 2016 without the expected subsequent increase in endowment balance. An 
inquiry with Kay Yates (personal communication, July 8, 2019), the System Director of 
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Development of the Kentucky Community and Technical College System (KCTCS), 
uncovered an error in the reporting. KCTCS holds an endowment for all sixteen colleges 
in the system. West Kentucky Community and Technical College and other individual 
institutions in the system also hold endowments with foundations. The endowment 
information provided annually to VSE reported only the FMV for the KCTCS 
endowment but both the KCTCS and Foundation endowment contributions (K. Yates, 
personal communication, July 8, 2019). The comparison is not an apples verses oranges 
analogy, but more like comparing apples and apple pie. Fourteen of the KCTCS entities 
hold foundation endowments and were removed from the sample due to the 
understatement of endowment balances. An additional five institutions (Columbia State 
Community College, Mansfield University, Rockland Community College, Schenectady 
County Community College, and Wake Technical Community College) reported unusual 
endowment balance trends that were not consistent with the balance reporting in IPEDS 
and were removed from the sample. The final sample consisted of 648 institutions.  
A panel dataset was created from the three sources (VSE, NACUBO Endowment 
Study/NTSE, and IPEDS) for fiscal years 2008 to 2017. Tables A.2, A.3, and A.4 in the 
Appendix provide comparisons of institutions in the full population of higher education 
endowments, the sample for each survey source, and my sample for the first research 
question. The sample distribution by institutional control aligns with the population, 
however two-year institutions, special focus four-year institutions, and endowments with 
lower balances are underrepresented. The sample composition is addressed in the 
discussion of limitations. 
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Model development. 
The basic model, 7%' = 	7%,'8,(1 +	
HIG
JI,GKA
)(1 +	;%')(1 −	=%'),	was run with the 
dataset to test the accuracy of estimating actual FMV of 7%'. Modifications were then 
made to compensate for the spending rate variable. The NCSE annual reports provide the 
effective spending rate calculated based on beginning endowment FMV. The basic model 
overestimates disbursements from the endowment by applying the spending rate to the 
endowment corpus, current year gifts, and current year return. The formula modification 
applies the spending rate to only the corpus and applies the return rate to both the 
beginning endowment FMV, net of spending, and new gifts. With the spending rate 
modification, the model was again run with the dataset and compared to the actual 
endowment FMVs. The results illustrated in Figure 1 demonstrate the strength of the 
annual estimation model as modified but prior to inclusion of a measurement error.  
Figure 1. Average ending endowment FMV, actual and estimated, by fiscal year-end.  
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The next modification was to include a measurement error variable. Estimation of 
two variables, rate of return and spending rate, generate measurement error. A 
comparison of the actual ending FMV to the model’s estimated ending FMV was used to 
determine the annual measurement error for each institution. The average measurement 
error across all institutions for all years is an underestimate of 0.0059. The average 
absolute value of the measurement error is higher, 0.0491. The use of the NTSE samples’ 
average spending and return rates based on endowment size does not capture differences 
in those variables based on individual institutional factors such as control or strategy. As 
previously noted, public institutions historically averaged lower effective spending rates 
than private institutions and the measurement error adjusts for those differences along 
with variances for rate of return. Table 3.3 reports the descriptive statistics for the 
absolute value of measurement error by institutional control. The measurement error is 
slightly larger for the public institutions, significantly so for two-year publics, than the 
private entities. Further analysis of the measurement error produced the same pattern 
based on institutional control within each larger endowment size segments, but the 
reverse for the two smallest size segments. This trend reflects the composition of each 
size segment with the larger segments dominated by private institutions and the smaller 
segments dominated by public institutions. The NACUBO/NCSE samples, as noted in 
Table 3.2, were nearly two-thirds private institutions, leading to more accurate 
representation of the private institution rates of return and spending in the averages. The 
average across each of the institutional control categories decreased from the smallest to 
the largest size sectors. While the variable is inversely related to the endowment size, the 
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difference in average measurement error by institutional control remained consistent 
across the size segments. 
Table 3.3 
 
Descriptive Statistics for the Absolute Value of Measurement Error, by Institutional 
Control (2008-17) 
Institutional 
Control 
Obs. Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Private, 
not-for-profit 
3,400 0.0439 0.0615 0.0000 1.0221 
Public, 
4-year 
2,640 0.0504 0.0681 0.0000 0.8874 
Public, 
2-year 440 0.0816 0.1219 0.0000 0.9573 
All 6,480 0.0491 0.0705 0.0000 1.0221 
 
Positive measurement errors reflect the model underestimated an endowment’s 
ending FMV and a negative represents an overestimate.  The function 
,
,8	LI,M
 adjusts the 
estimate accordingly. If there is no measurement error, the 6%,N term equals zero and the 
function is one. If the model underestimates, the 6%,N term is positive, and the function is 
greater than one, increasing the estimate. If the model overestimates, the 6%,N term is 
negative, and the function is less than one, reducing the estimate. The final modified 
model is as follows: 
7%' = [7%,'8,(1 −	=%') + :%'(1 − >')](1 +	;%')(
,
,8	LI,M
). 
The selected time period is the ten-year span from 2008 to 2017. Individual 
marginal tax rate brackets were relatively stable in this timeframe. Tax rate schedules are 
indexed for inflation to prevent migration to higher brackets. For 2013, a new tax bracket 
75 
	
was added for the highest taxable income bracket, $400,000 and higher, with a 39.6% tax 
rate. Table 3.4 reviews the number of tax returns with, and dollar value of, charitable 
deductions claimed in each available tax year by adjusted gross income categories. The 
percentage of tax returns claiming a charitable contribution itemized deduction by 
adjusted gross income category was consistent throughout the observed years, especially 
for the highest bracket. The distribution of charitable deduction dollar values experienced 
slight fluctuations but was consistent across the period considering the Great Recession 
experienced around tax year 2009. No other significant variations are noted that would 
cause concern for using 2008-17 in this study. 
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Table 3.4 
 
Charitable Contribution Itemized Deduction Tax Filer Frequency and Charitable 
Contribution Distribution by Adjusted Gross Income (AGI) and Tax Year 
Tax Year Under 
$20,000 
$20,000 <  
$75,000 
$75,000 < 
$200,000 
$200,000 + 
2008 
1,921 (3.9) 
$3,051 (1.8) 
15,838 (25.0) 
$37,054 (21.4) 
17,579 (68.7) 
$60,493 (35.0) 
3,912 (89.4) 
$72,337 (41.8) 
2009 
1,976 (4.0) 
$3,362 (2.1) 
14,986 (24.0) 
$35,862 (22.7) 
16,754 (67.1) 
$59,680 (37.8) 
3,527 (89.9) 
$59,112 (37.4) 
2010 
1,938 (3.9) 
$3,244 (1.9) 
15,028 (23.7) 
$36,627 (21.5) 
17,321 (67.1) 
$61,293 (36.0) 
3,856 (89.7) 
$69,072 (40.6) 
2011 
1,842 (3.7) 
$3,011 (1.7) 
14,201 (22.3) 
$35,287 (20.2) 
17,559 (65.8) 
$63,085 (36.2) 
4,188 (89.1) 
$73,091 (41.9) 
2012 1,674 (3.4) 
$2,832 (1.4) 
13,473 (21.3) 
$35,009 (17.6) 
17,602 (63.4) 
$64,600 (32.4) 
4,617 (87.9) 
$96,830 (48.6) 
2013 
1,560 (3.2) 
$2,661 (1.4) 
12,512 (19.6) 
$33,904 (17.4) 
17,553 (60.5) 
$67,112 (34.5) 
4,806 (86.5) 
$90,987 (46.7) 
2014 
1,349 (2.8) 
$2,262 (1.1) 
11,739 (18.2) 
$32,503 (15.4) 
17,784 (58.6) 
$68,847 (32.7) 
5,349 (85.9) 
$106,985 (50.8) 
2015 
1,403 (3.0) 
$2,497 (1.1) 
11,357 (17.4) 
$32,830 (14.8) 
18,058 (57.6) 
$71,819 (32.4) 
5,805 (86.0) 
$114,705 (51.7) 
2016 
1,395 (3.0) 
$2,460 (1.1) 
11,446 (17.4) 
$33,999 (14.5) 
18,178 (57.1) 
$73,056 (31.2) 
5,917 (85.8) 
$124,352 (53.2) 
2017 
1,314 (3.0) 
$2,469 (1.0) 
11,032 (17.0) 
$33,438 (14.1) 
18,123 (55.6) 
$75,185 (31.6) 
6,381 (85.3) 
$126,968 (53.3) 
 
Notes: Number of tax returns with charitable contribution itemized deduction, in 
thousands, and as a percentage of all tax returns in the AGI bracket. Charitable 
deductions claimed, in millions, and as a percentage of total charitable deductions for all 
returns. 
Source: Compiled from IRS Statistics of Income Division, Source of Income files. 
 
Descriptive statistics. 
Descriptive statistics were generated for the continuous variables in the estimation 
model. Due to skewness of two variables, endowment FMV and contributions to 
endowment, the median is reported along with the mean, standard deviation, minimum, 
and maximum. In addition to the descriptive statistics for all institutions in each year, 
statistics are reported for ten-year averages by endowment size quartile and institutional 
control. The mean, standard deviation, minimum, and maximum are provided for the 
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annual return rate, spending rate, and measurement error. Descriptive statistics are also 
provided for the ten-year average combined rates of return, spending, and measurement 
error as the lack of institution-specific measures prevent an informative analysis on the 
individual variables. Frequency counts are provided by institutional control and 
trendlines for the growth components are presented. Two additional categorical measures 
were created to further analyze endowment and contribution sizes, ten-year average 
endowment FMV per ten-year average FTE student enrollment and ten-year endowment 
contributions as a percentage of 2017 endowment FMV. Descriptive statistics are 
presented for each of these variables for the full sample and by quartiles, institutional 
control, and total endowment size. 
Analysis. 
The final modified model was run on the panel dataset to predict the ending 
endowment FMV ten years post-implementation as if the TCJA was enacted as of fiscal 
year 2008. Descriptive statistics were compared for the predicted and actual ending 
endowment FMV for the tenth year, 2017. Comparative trend lines over the ten-year 
period were also generated. The analysis was performed for the subsectors of the data 
based on institutional control, endowment size, and contributions to the endowment as a 
percentage of the 2017 endowment balance. The model is designed to reduce 
contributions by a constant 4.5% and replicate the same rate of return and rate of 
spending that each institution annually experienced. The return and spending dollar 
values are impacted by the base of the endowment, the ending FMV of assets. The base is 
increased by 95.5% of contributions and, therefore, the return and spending are changed 
proportionally across all institutions each year. The measurement error compensates for 
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institutional differences in the return and spending rates, preventing the decoupling of the 
two variables. For these reasons, analysis on the return and spending variables do not 
provide discriminatory data.  
Research Question 2 
Description of method 
The first research question seeks to measure impact to endowment wealth from a 
change in tax policy expected to reduce charitable contributions. In the second question I 
extend the findings by identifying the institutional and endowment characteristics 
correlated with greater proportions of endowment gifts that are donated by individuals, 
thus more susceptible to the expected impact. The intent is not to determine a causal 
relationship but identify characteristic patterns that indicate larger proportions of 
individual giving to endowments and, thus, greater concern with personal income tax 
policy related to charitable contributions. A cross-section dataset is used to estimate a 
model using ordinary least squares regression. The dataset includes the annual 
contributions to each institution’s endowment by source, enabling inference of 
endowments with high reliance on giving from individuals as opposed to corporations, 
foundations, or other organizations. In the following section I further describe the 
variables used in the analysis. 
Variables 
The second research question employs regression analysis with the proportion of 
contributions from individuals as the dependent variable. Seven independent variables are 
considered in the analysis including institutional control, Carnegie classification, 
inclusion of a hospital, student enrollment in the fall semester of the academic year, 
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percentage of undergraduate students awarded Pell Grants, published tuition and fees, 
and endowment size measured by FMV. Each of the variables used in the analysis is 
described in the following sections. 
Dependent variable. 
Proportion of endowment contributions from individuals. 
The dependent variable, endowment contributions from individuals, is derived 
from variables extracted from the VSE survey and calculated as a proportion of all giving 
to endowments. Charitable contributions to endowments are reported for each institution 
and the data include contributions to endowment by source (donor type) as follows: 
alumni, parents, other individuals, corporations, foundations, fundraising consortia, 
religious organizations, and other organizations. Three variables – alumni, parents, and 
other individuals – represent giving from individual donors. CASE (2018) defines alumni 
as former students who earned credit toward an offered degree, certificate, or diploma. 
The alumni label has precedence over any other donor source category. Parents include 
grandparents and guardians of current and former students. Other individuals include 
board members, employees, and any persons not otherwise considered alumni or parents.  
While giving influenced by personal tax policies could be funneled through one or 
more of the remaining variables, there is no ability to distinguish that type of giving. One 
example is the donor advised fund (DAF) currently captured within other organizations. 
DAFs allow individuals to contribute tax-deductible gifts to an intermediary and 
subsequently advise the fund to distribute the gift to charitable entities. Ultimately the 
decision to give to the charitable entity belongs to the intermediary as the donor releases 
all rights upon giving to the DAF. CASE (2019a) reported giving to universities, not just 
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endowments, through a DAF increased 65.8% in dollar value and 18.8% in number of 
donors between 2017 and 2018, most likely in response to the TCJA. The sharp increase 
in giving through DAFs began subsequent to the time period examined in this 
dissertation. The preponderance of giving from individuals is captured in the three 
identified categories reflected in the derived variable. The proportion from individuals 
was calculated from the sum of total endowment gifts and multiplied by 100 to state the 
variable as a percentage of total endowment giving with possible outcomes between zero 
and 100. 
Independent variables. 
Institutional control 
IPEDS classifies institutional control as public, private not-for-profit, or private 
for-profit. For-profit institutions are excluded from this study as contributions to these 
entities are not eligible for tax deduction and, therefore, would not be impacted by 
individual income tax policy changes in the same manner as public and private not-for-
profit institutions. Public universities are supported through public funds and 
administered by elected or appointed officials. Private not-for-profit institutions do not 
receive state appropriations and are primarily supported through private sources. Terry 
and Macy (2007) found giving is correlated with the private institution structure. State 
appropriations have been negatively correlated with giving from both alumni and all 
sources except corporations (Leslie & Ramey, 1988; Liu, 2006). A dummy variable was 
created to denote private institutions. 
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Carnegie classification. 
The Carnegie classification, originally published in 1973, is regularly updated and 
provides a widely-accepted framework to classify U.S. higher education institutions 
(NCES, 2019b). Institutions are categorized into broad groups based on degrees 
conferred and further subdivided based on other variables. I use the Carnegie 
Classification 2015: Basic variable extracted from IPEDS which provides the following 
broad groupings: Doctoral, Master’s, Baccalaureate, Associate’s, Special Focus, and 
Tribal College (NCES, 2019b). The latter two groups are carved out from the former 
groupings. The Carnegie Classification of Institutions of Higher Education (n.d.) further 
subdivides the Doctoral group by the quantitative level of research, measured by research 
expenditures and staffing, as highest, higher, or moderate research activity. The Master’s 
and Baccalaureate groupings are subdivided by the number of degrees conferred and 
programs offered. The Associate’s groupings are subdivided by the disciplinary focus and 
primary student demographic. The Special Focus group is categorized by the length or 
program and field of specialization; the Tribal College group is not subdivided. The 
frequency distribution by Carnegie classification is presented in Tables A.1 and A.2 of 
the Appendix. Liu (2006) found doctoral and research universities receive more gifts 
from corporations and foundations. Dummy variables were created to denote each of the 
broad groups based on the Carnegie classifications. The sample does not include any 
tribal colleges; therefore, no dummy variable was created for that category.  
Inclusion of hospital 
Hospitals alter the dynamics of an institution’s infrastructure, increase the entity’s 
exposure to the community, provide additional partnership opportunities, and shift the 
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financial reporting snapshot through additional revenues and expenditures. Institutions 
were identified by NCES as having a hospital based on financial variables reported in the 
IPEDS survey. Institutions are deemed to have a hospital if revenue or expenses from 
hospital services are reported. Revenues and expenses are reported for hospitals operated 
by and reported as a part of the institution (NCES, 2019b). A dummy variable was 
created to denote institutions with hospitals. 
Student enrollment. 
The FTE enrollment variable is calculated by IPEDS using fall undergraduate and 
graduate student headcounts reported by the institution and provides a measure of 
institutional size. The calculation converts part-time students into fractions of full-time 
students and combines the two for a total FTE headcount. Conversion rates vary based on 
the institutional control; a part-time undergraduate is equivalent to 0.403543 FTE and a 
part-time graduate is equivalent to 0.361702 FTE at a four-year public institution, 
0.392857 FTE undergraduate and 0.382059 FTE graduate at a four-year private 
institution, and 0.335737 FTE undergraduate at a two-year public institution (NCES, 
2019b). Research on giving to colleges and universities centers on giving from alumni 
and what drives alumni to donate. Based on a compilation of the source data reported to 
CASE over the twelve years ended in 2018, the alumni category averages 36% of all 
endowment gifts. While the size of the student body does not indicate demographic 
characteristics, the number of potential alumni may be informative. Liu (2006) found 
institutional size, when measured by FTE students, increases alumni giving. 
 
 
83 
	
Pell Grant awards 
Undergraduate students with significant financial need may be awarded a Federal 
Pell Grant to cover the cost of attendance. Grants, in most cases, are not required to be 
repaid, unlike student loans. Cunningham and Cochi-Ficano (2002) correlated institutions 
with higher levels of need-based aid with alumni giving, however Clotfelter found 
individual alumni receiving need-based aid were less likely to subsequently give. Higher 
percentages of Pell Grant recipients have been found to be negatively correlated with 
alumni giving (Terry & Macy, 2007). Institutions report the percentage of undergraduate 
students awarded Pell Grant aid (NCES, 2019b). The variable is stated as a percentage of 
enrollment with possible outcomes between zero and 100. 
Published tuition and fees.  
The published tuition and fees variable is reported by each institution. According 
to the IPEDS glossary, the variable is the published cost of tuition and fees for one 
academic year for full-time, first-time undergraduate students (NCES, 2019b). The first-
time undergraduate rate is the base-level tuition. Many institutions charge tuition and fees 
based on credit-hours earned, with higher rates on upper-division courses and graduate 
programs. Public universities have differential tuition based on residency. While there is 
no difference for privates, both in-state and out-of-state published rates are considered. 
Out-of-state tuition and fees are higher and more comparable to private school tuition. 
The published rate does not represent the average tuition and fees paid by students as 
many schools, especially private colleges, have high discount rates. Students also receive 
financial aid and student loans from internal and external sources to cover the cost of 
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attendance. In-state tuition is reported to be positively associated with alumni giving but 
negatively associated with giving from all other sources (Liu, 2006). 
Endowment size. 
The VSE survey collects the endowment FMV at the end of each fiscal year. 
Survey instructions direct participants to include true, term, and quasi-endowment funds 
and public institutions to include endowment from affiliated foundations (CASE, 2018). 
Higher levels of endowment wealth are associated with higher levels of giving from 
alumni, specifically, and all sources generally (Ehrenberg & Smith, 2003; Terry & Macy, 
2007). Cunningham and Cochi-Ficano (2002) found higher endowment per student 
significantly increased subsequent alumni giving and Leslie and Ramey (1988) found 
endowment per alumnus was positively correlated to non-alumni giving. However, 
Harrison et al. (1995) reported endowment size did not have predictive value on alumni 
giving. The variable represents the ending FMV for fiscal year 2017 and is used to 
measure endowment size independent of institution size. 
Analysis 
Sample selection and data cleaning. 
The population of interest for the second research question includes all public and 
private, not-for-profit colleges and universities, including affiliated foundations, in the 
U.S. that hold endowments. The initial sample for this study was from the VSE database 
and included 941 U.S. higher education institutions reporting endowment balances during 
fiscal year 2017. Institutions without gifts to endowment in fiscal year 2017 were 
removed, eliminating 41 colleges and universities. An additional 236 institutions that did 
not report gifts by source and 2 institutions that reported total gifts to endowment that do 
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not match the sum of reported gifts by source were removed. Three institutions were 
removed due to inconsistency in reporting as combined or separate between databases 
(Linfield College, Moravian College, and Moravian Seminary). Only partial IPEDS data 
was available for 21 colleges and universities and were removed due to incomplete 
variables. Thirteen KCTCS institutions removed in research question one due to 
underreported endowment balances were removed for the same reason. One of the 
KCTCS institutions removed in research question one was previously eliminated for 
research question two as there were no endowment gifts reported for fiscal year 2017. 
Two of the five institutions that were discovered in research question one to report 
unusual endowment balance trends not consistent with the balance reporting in IPEDS, 
Columbia State Community College and Mansfield University, were also removed from 
the sample. The remaining three were previously removed due to no reported endowment 
gifts for fiscal year 2017. The continuous variables were tested for normality and were 
found to exhibit skewness. Numerous transformations were attempted on the variables 
exhibiting skewness. Log-transformation provides a normal distribution for student 
enrollment, percentage of Pell Grants, and endowment size. The in-state tuition and fees 
variable is bi-modal and highly correlated with institutional control. The out-of-state 
tuition and fees variable, however, is normally distributed and not as highly correlated 
with institutional control. The final sample consisted of 623 institutions. A cross-
sectional dataset was created from the two sources, VSE and IPEDS, for fiscal year 2017.  
Tables A.2, A.3, and A.4 in the Appendix provide comparisons of institutions in 
the full population of higher education endowments, the sample for each survey source, 
and my sample for the second research question. The sample distribution by institutional 
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control aligns with the population, however two-year institutions, special focus four-year 
institutions, and endowments with lower balances are underrepresented. The sample 
composition is addressed in the discussion of limitations. The referenced tables in the 
Appendix also provide a comparison of the samples between the research questions, 
indicating a consistent distribution by institutional control, endowment size, and Carnegie 
Classification groupings. The use of data from the 2017 fiscal year (July 2016 to June 
2017) represents the most recent period without the enactment, or full understanding of, 
the TCJA. Once taxpayers realized, in late calendar year 2017, the certainty of the TCJA 
enactment, behaviors may have altered to either anticipate the impending new tax 
advantages or compensate for impending disadvantages. The dataset used represents a 
period of habitual behavior as tax policy had not substantially modified charitable 
contribution structures in recent history. (Habit persistence regarding giving and tax 
policy is discussed by Broman (1989), Barrett (1991), and Barrett et al. (1997), but was 
first estimated by Clotfelter (as cited in Barrett et al, 1997, p. 322).) 
Descriptive statistics. 
Descriptive statistics were generated for the continuous variables. For reader ease, 
the non-transformed variables are reported in these statistics. The median is reported, due 
to skewness of the variables, along with the mean, standard deviation, minimum, and 
maximum. A frequency matrix is presented for the categorical variables. In addition to 
the full-sample statistics for all variables, medians and interquartile ranges are reported 
for each continuous variable by categorical variable. 
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Analysis. 
An ordinary least squares regression model is estimated with the 2017 dataset. As 
noted, the intent is not to determine a causal relationship, but identify characteristic 
patterns that indicate larger proportions of individual giving to endowments and greater 
concern with personal income tax policy related to charitable contributions. Bivariate 
linear regression is first considered for each variable and correlation between the 
independent variables is examined. Multivariate regression is used to test various models 
with the relevant independent variables. 
Limitations 
There are limitations and weaknesses to this study. The study assumes higher 
education institutions will not alter behaviors or policies due to the new tax policy or the 
consequences of the new tax policy. In reality, institutions may adjust spending from 
endowments, modify investment policies, or take other steps to combat an expected 
reduction in contributions. This would not be a significant concern if the study was 
confined to a short time period, but the long-run view may overestimate the impact as the 
time horizon provides ample reaction time. The use of historical data reflects these types 
of adjustments but can also be viewed as a weakness. While markets, donors, and 
administrators will not exactly replicate reactions to various economic environments, the 
historical data provided observed reactions from multiple points of time and 
combinations of factors. For example, an economic downturn and fall in market values 
may result in reduced contributions from donors and management-induced changes in 
spending from endowments. Decisions of that nature are reflected in the historical data. 
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However, there is no control over the numerous factors that influenced the realized 
outcomes. 
Two additional sets of challenges surround identification of the percentage change 
in contributions variable. The first limitation is the treatment of all giving sources as 
individuals even though non-individual donors do not have the same tax incentives for 
giving. The VSE data reveals the majority of giving to endowments does come from 
individuals. Averaging giving from 2008-17, 61.3% of endowment gifts were from 
alumni, parents, and other individuals (CASE, 2019b). The next largest group is 
foundations with 25.9% and the remaining 12.8% is from corporations (7.3%), other 
organizations (5.3%), and fundraising consortia (0.2%) (CASE, 2019b). These 
percentages are consistent with the 2017 data and comparable to all giving reported by 
Giving USA. For calendar year 2017, Giving USA (2018) reported 79% of all 
contributions were from individuals, 16% from foundations, and 5% from corporations. 
Gifts from foundations, fundraising consortia, and other nongovernmental organizations 
are arguably indirectly from individual donors. Contributions from these sources are 
potentially impacted by the individual tax policy with a delayed reaction. Giving USA 
(2018) reported 9% of all contributions in 2017 were from bequests, an estimated $36.9 
billion. The IRS (n.d.) summary of income files estimated $21 billion in charitable 
deductions were claimed on estate returns for the 2017 tax year. For the period 2008 to 
2016, deductions claimed on estate returns were, on average, 7.8% of charitable 
deductions claimed by individuals and estates (IRS, n.d.). While estates and corporations 
have tax incentives for charitable deductions, the tax policies are not identical to the 
individual tax policies. 
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The second limitation of the change in contributions variable is the selection of 
the tax price elasticity used in the referenced microsimulations. While the empirical 
research on tax price elasticity is vast, there is little consensus on precise measurements 
for specific groups of taxpayers or charitable causes. This study’s aim is to focus on a 
very specific charitable cause for a particular type of nonprofit organization type, which 
may have a unique donor profile. The empirical research on the characteristics that may 
profile an endowment donor are limited, inconclusive, or contradictory in many cases. 
Contradictory studies find that high-income groups are more elastic than lower-income 
groups (Auten et al., 1992), less elastic than lower-income groups (Greenwood, as cited 
by Lin & Lo, 2012, p. 549), and similar in elasticity to all other income groups (Bakija & 
Heim, 2011). Elasticity based on net worth does not indicate variance between groups 
(Peloza & Steel, 2005), but there is difficulty in identifying a reliable proxy for net worth 
in tax-file data research. Research finds donors of large gifts are price inelastic (Lin & 
Lo, 2012), but also that donors to education are price elastic (Duquette, 2016; Yetman & 
Yetman, 2013). The limited research available on price elasticity of bequests supports 
greater elasticity as compared to the average elasticity of inter-vivos gifts (Peloza & 
Steel, 2005). In addition to varying by donor, tax price elasticity may also vary across 
time by a lagging reaction to changes. Barrett (1991) finds donors time gifts in 
anticipation of tax price changes, increase giving prior to an increase in price, and delay 
giving in response to a decrease in price. Donors adjust to a new level of giving within 
two years (Barrett et al., 1997; Broman, 1989). Without greater consensus about the 
profile and tax behaviors of donors to endowments, the assumptions regarding tax price 
elasticity of giving can misrepresent impact. 
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In an effort to identify the institutional endowments most susceptible to the 
projected impact of individual tax policies, the study builds on foundational research 
focused on individual giving motivations. This study examines institutional and 
endowment characteristics, but the findings may be biased by omitted observations and 
variables. The availability of data and structure of the first research question (requiring 
ten consecutive years of reporting) likely drove the sample to be biased with institutions 
possessing both the financial and human resources to respond to the VSE and NACUBO 
surveys. While the reliance of individual giving on endowments may be correlated with 
the examined variables and consistent with excluded institutions, the demographics of 
who is giving could be driving much of the disparities. The availability of data produced 
a limited sample size and prohibits inclusion of these and other potentially correlated 
factors. In addition, a single-year study runs the risk of not being reflective of all years, 
nor of being an accurate representation of future years.  
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Chapter 4: Findings and Conclusions 
 
Chapter four presents the results of the analysis and begins with the purpose of the 
study. Descriptive statistics for each research question are followed by results and 
interpretation and discussion of findings. The chapter concludes by addressing limitations 
and implications for future research. 
Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this study is to analyze precisely the direct and indirect impact of 
personal income tax regulations on the charitable sector. It will do so by disaggregating 
data to delineate clearly the differential consequences that distinguish higher education 
from other components of the broad charitable sector umbrella. A fundamental premise 
of this research is that systematic understanding of differences within the charitable 
sector can lead to informed reconsideration of policy making. It also will assist colleges 
and universities to make more informed decisions in terms of financial planning and 
resource allocation. 
 My study is significant and timely because the measures reported in most 
research, used by policy-makers and cited by the popular press, broadly relate to the 
entire charitable industry as a whole. I argue that although this presentation is technically 
accurate, it is incomplete and misleading because it lacks distinctions among categories 
of institutions and groups within the charitable sector. However, my caution is that 
numerous research studies have found tax-price elasticity variations dependent on 
industry sector (Duquette, 2016; Feldstein, 1975; Yetman & Yetman, 2013). Clotfelter 
(1990) found disparity in tax policy impact following the Tax Reform Act of 1986, with 
only museums and higher education experiencing the predicted decline in giving. Cordes 
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(2011) projected an assumed reduction in giving to estimate revenue impact by sector and 
found variations as well.  
In addition to these distinctions in impact, long-run outlooks on a reduction in 
giving was lacking from discussions surrounding recent tax legislation, failing to fully 
address the potential effect on not-for-profits reliant on endowments. Measuring the 
impact of a resource flow change is short-sighted when limited to a single-year for 
endowment giving. The consequences of a single-year loss, material or not, will be fully 
realized over multiple years. Research is needed to address the unique structures of 
endowments.  
This study seeks to contribute to the ongoing debates about rising higher 
education costs and accumulating endowment wealth by illuminating consequences to 
take under consideration, provide evidence to support or refute the wisdom of proposed 
tax policy, and inform future policy. Higher education administrators, endowment 
managers, advocates, and policymakers should have interest in the results. The research 
questions addressed in this study include: 
1. What is the long-run financial impact of a tax policy proposal that changes the 
tax price of giving on endowments of higher education institutions? 
2. What institutional characteristics identify institutions with greater relevance to 
personal income tax policies measured by higher reliance on individual giving 
to university endowments? 
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Research Question One 
Descriptive Statistics 
This section provides descriptive statistics for the first research question. All 
presented monetary measures are inflation-adjusted to 2017 dollar values (U.S. 
Department of Labor, 2019). Descriptive statistics of the unadjusted data are presented in 
Tables A.5 through A.7 of the Appendix. Four categorical variables are used to analyze 
the findings. Table 4.1 presents the frequency distribution for the time-invariant 
categorical variable. Institutional control reflects a close to even split in the sample 
between private and public institutions. The majority of the sample’s public institutions 
are four-year colleges and universities. While it is possible for institutions to change the 
control structure, as some two-year publics have expanded to four-year campuses, no 
institutions in the sample made a control change in the observed period. Two-year public 
institutions comprise a small portion of the sample. The sample distribution is not 
reflective of the population of higher education institutions. Consistent with the sample, 
IPEDS reports half of the U.S. institutions are private (NCES, 2019b). The remaining 
half of the sample is heavily weighted with four-year publics whereas IPEDS reports 
more two-year publics, 28% of the total population. While the sample distribution is not 
in alignment with the higher education population holding endowments, the sample is in 
alignment with higher education institutions that participated in the NACUBO Study of 
Endowments and the NCSE. Chapter three of this dissertation provides a comparative 
analysis of this dissertation’s sample and the NACUBO/NCSE samples. The remaining 
categorical variables are presented in Tables 4.3, 4.9, and 4.10 and are quartiles based on 
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size and contribution measures. Those are discussed alongside the relevant continuous 
variables.  
Table 4.1 
 
Frequency Distribution of Time-Invariant Categorical Variable 
Variable Frequency (%) 
Institutional Control  
Private, not-for-profit 340 (52.5) 
Public, 4-year 264 (40.7) 
Public, 2-year 44 (6.8) 
 
 
Descriptive statistics for the endowment size and contribution continuous 
variables are presented in Tables 4.2 through 4.6. Table 4.2 presents inflation-adjusted 
endowment ending FMVs. Endowment balances fluctuated throughout the observed ten-
year period with the average and median highs in 2017 and lows in 2009. The fiscal years 
run July to June and 2009 encompasses the economic downturn experienced in late 2008 
and early 2009. Overall growth from the 2007 base year to 2017 was 17.5% for the 
average and 22.5% for the median. Harvard University, a private institution, reported the 
sample’s maximum balance in each year and Nashville State Community College, a two-
year public institution, reported the sample’s minimum balance in each year. The lowest 
minimum and maximum balances for the ten-year period were observed in 2008 and 
2009, respectively. The largest minimum balance was observed in 2017 and the largest 
maximum balance was observed in 2008. Chapter one notes the steep decline in 
alternative investment values during the Great Recession and the liquidity issues 
subsequently created by alternatives. Harvard, notorious for being heavily invested in 
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alternatives, represents the largest maximum balance of the sample and has yet to recover 
to the FMV of 2008. As evident with the large standard deviations, the endowment sizes 
are significantly dispersed throughout the observed period. Table 4.3 demonstrates the 
variation with the introduction of a categorical variable derived from the ten-year average 
endowment FMV, stated in 2017 dollars. Descriptive statistics for the ten-year average 
FMV is provided by institutional control, revealing an association between institutional 
control and endowment size. The derived categorical variable identifies the size quartile. 
Figure 2 provides a visual representation of the dispersion of endowment sizes between 
the three institutional control categories across the observed period. The bands in the bars 
report the frequency counts of endowments by size quartile, with the darker band being 
the smaller endowments. Private institutions in the sample hold a larger number of 
quartile four endowments with the two-year publics being almost exclusively represented 
in quartile one. Four-year public institutions had the greatest shift into higher quartiles 
over the observed period. Seven entities moved from size quartile one and gains were 
made in quartiles two (one additional institution), three (two additional institutions), and 
four (four additional institutions). Two-year publics gained one spot in quartile two from 
quartile one. Privates lost the net from quartiles two, three, and four with a shift of eight 
into quartile one. Overall, however, the quartiles were relatively stable. Figure 3 provides 
trendlines of the median endowment FMV from 2008 to 2017 by institutional control, 
highlighting the dispersion of endowment wealth. 
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Table 4.2 
 
Descriptive Statistics for Actual Endowment FMV by Fiscal Year, Adjusted for Inflation 
to 2017 Dollar Value 
Fiscal 
Year Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
2008 616,504,701 86,115,511 2,416,164,000 248,617 40,611,295,200 
2009 487,123,022 67,446,152 1,806,753,000 406,051 28,982,768,340 
2010 521,571,837 74,672,725 1,906,730,000 434,915 30,206,488,480 
2011 592,020,028 85,598,631 2,171,574,000 263,094 34,247,421,770 
2012 578,589,452 84,692,054 2,116,745,000 270,515 32,252,686,860 
2013 623,103,239 93,306,722 2,238,918,000 311,412 33,636,469,650 
2014 705,626,051 101,623,160 2,520,126,000 376,381 36,623,419,540 
2015 727,834,200 102,817,676 2,612,873,000 419,490 37,211,036,600 
2016 702,310,826 103,688,427 2,520,968,000 438,258 34,903,590,120 
2017 756,629,401 110,430,278 2,666,715,000 464,758 35,657,090,000 
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Table 4.3 
Descriptive Statistics for Ten-Year Average Actual Endowment FMV by Institutional Control and Ten-Year Average Actual 
Endowment FMV Quartile, Adjusted for Inflation to 2017 Dollar Value 
Variable Mean Median Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum 
All Institutions 631,131,276 91,460,713 2,292,214,000 363,349 34,433,226,656 
Institutional Control 
Private, not-for-
profit 867,408,502 136,703,207 2,986,581,000 2,370,906 34,433,226,656 
Public, 4-year 430,517,433 71,230,582 1,118,618,000 1,364,549 9,356,463,460 
Public, 2-year 9,035,761 7,072,694 8,376,000 363,349 39,921,680 
Endowment Size 
Quartile 1 17,448,010 17,345,209 9,933,000 363,349 34,864,875 
Quartile 2 59,262,418 57,170,420 16,036,000 35,014,049 91,420,513 
Quartile 3 188,776,130 175,239,476 74,717,000 91,500,912 372,386,743 
Quartile 4 2,259,038,545 863,549,903 4,187,780,000 376,622,256 34,433,226,656 
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Figure 2. Frequency distributions of categorical variables. Quartiles are based on the 
annual actual endowment FMV, adjusted for inflation to 2017 dollar value. 
 
 
  
Figure 3. Median actual endowment FMV, adjusted for inflation to 2017 dollar value, by 
institutional control. 
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Table 4.4 presents the descriptive statistics for actual contributions to endowment, 
inflation-adjusted to 2017 dollar values. The highest average was reported in 2017 and 
the highest median in 2008. The lowest average was reported in 2010 and the lowest 
median in 2009. Table 4.5 shows numerous institutions reported no endowment gifts in at 
least one of the observed years and three institutions, two two-year publics and one four-
year public, reported no endowment contributions throughout the ten-year period. Of the 
133 no-gift observations, only four were reported by private institutions. The remaining 
no-gift observations were equally distributed between two- and four-year publics, even 
though two-year publics represent only 6.8% of the sample. The largest total 
contributions to endowments in each year was to private institutions – Cornell University 
in 2009, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) in 2011, Stanford University in 
2012, and Harvard University in all remaining years. Table 4.6 reflects the descriptive 
statistics for the ten-year average contributions to endowment, inflation-adjusted to 2017 
dollars. Much like endowment FMVs, the contributions and endowment size are 
associated. The descriptive statistics by institutional control again demonstrate that two-
year publics are not, as a group, receiving an equal share of endowment donations. The 
ten-year average contributions for privates and four-year publics, however, are more 
closely aligned as compared to the difference in endowment size. 
The remaining model variables are presented in Tables 4.7 and 4.8. Return rates 
reflect the oscillating economy experienced in the observed period, with significant losses 
in 2009 and strong gains in 2011 and 2014. Fiscal year 2012 reported relatively flat 
returns on investments, but some endowments experienced a slight gain while others 
experienced a slight loss. Even with these fluctuations in returns, the spending rates were 
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stable over the decade, hovering around 4%. As noted in chapter three, the annual rates of 
return and spending are not available for specific institutions. Average rates as reported 
by NACUBO/NCSE were applied according to endowment size and an annual 
institutional measurement error was calculated to adjust for estimation variances. 
Measurement error averaged 0.59% over the observed period, however the absolute 
values averaged 4.91%. The largest measurement errors were observed in the 2009 and 
2010 fiscal years data, volatile years of investment return, with one observation of 
measurement error over 100% by Jacksonville University, a small private college. The 
minimum and maximum measurement errors for each year were not dominated by an 
individual institution or institutional control type. However, two-year publics were 
overrepresented with one-third of the minimum and maximum measurement errors but 
only 6.8% of the total sample. The measurement error corrects for both the return and 
spending rates and, for this reason, prevents a more thorough evaluation of each variable 
separately.  
The combination of the return, spending, and measurement error rates reflect the 
percentage change in endowment FMV, exclusive of contributions. Table 4.8 presents 
descriptive statistics for the ten-year average of the combined rates. Unlike endowment 
size and contributions, the combined return and spending rates are not significantly 
varied based on institutional control or size quartile. Combined rates are slightly higher 
and less varied for the largest endowment size quartile. The smallest endowment size 
quartile reports the next highest average and median combined rates, but with greater 
variation. The positive values of the average and median combined rates indicate that 
more than half of the sample did not distribute funds greater than the return.  
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Figure 4 presents a trendline of the annual average combined return and spending 
percentage experienced. A second trendline represents the change in contributions, year 
over year, for the observed period. The trendlines demonstrate that the year-over-year 
change in average contributions moves in a pattern similar to the movement of the rate of 
return and spending rate combined. The average spending rates remained stable 
throughout the period, leading to an assumption that the change in contributions largely 
follow the rate of return behavior. However, the measurement error is included in the 
combined measure to correct for the variance between average rates and actual rates at 
the institutional level and prevents a decoupling of the two variables for analysis 
purposes.  
Table 4.4 
 
Descriptive Statistics for Actual Contributions to Endowment by Fiscal Year, Adjusted 
for Inflation to 2017 Dollar Value 
Fiscal 
Year Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
2008 12,331,332 2,750,464 32,533,000 – 333,605,440 
2009 9,151,972 1,921,628 24,474,000 – 284,146,890 
2010 9,124,032 2,067,406 22,801,000 – 269,688,160 
2011 10,268,442 2,340,753 27,459,000 – 350,326,123 
2012 9,915,952 2,123,507 29,708,000 – 437,840,643 
2013 10,204,305 2,287,133 24,426,000 – 233,825,550 
2014 12,565,258 2,455,561 35,889,000 – 528,238,590 
2015 11,945,882 2,738,989 30,239,000 – 371,869,347 
2016 12,002,399 2,193,974 32,469,000 – 498,574,665 
2017 13,423,009 2,476,739 39,869,000 – 515,494,565 
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Table 4.5 
 
Frequency Distribution of No-Gifts-to-Endowment Observations by Institutional Control 
and Fiscal Year 
Institutional 
Control 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Private,  
not-for-
profit 
2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Public, 4-
year 8 7 8 6 7 6 7 7 7 7 
Public, 2-
year 
6 5 8 6 4 5 5 4 8 8 
 
Table 4.6 
 
Descriptive Statistics for Ten-Year Average Actual Contributions to Endowment by 
Institutional Control and Ten-Year Average Actual Endowment FMV Quartile, Adjusted 
for Inflation to 2017 Dollar Value 
Variable Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
All 
Institutions 
11,093,258 2,628,876 28,360,000 – 345,833,830 
Institutional 
Control      
Private, 
not-for-
profit 
13,192,657 2,977,640 35,559,000 81,023 345,833,830 
Public, 4-
year 
10,173,672 2,949,690 17,973,000 – 125,633,034 
Public, 2-
year 
388,146 207,148 573,000 – 3,030,622 
Endowment 
Size 
     
Quartile 1 746,075 599,842 612,000 – 3,363,174 
Quartile 2 1,904,715 1,593,781 1,154,000 197,947 5,905,715 
Quartile 3 4,934,280 4,237,416 3,104,000 576,444 18,845,292 
Quartile 4 36,787,963 19,787,208 48,225,000 2,143,032 345,833,830 
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Table 4.7 
 
Descriptive Statistics for Rate of Return, Spending Rate, and Measurement Error by 
Fiscal Year 
Fiscal 
Year 
Return Rate  Spending Rate Measurement Error 
 
Mean  
(Std. 
dev.) 
Min Max 
Mean  
(Std. 
dev.) 
Min Max 
Mean  
(Std. 
dev.) 
Min Max 
2008 
-0.030 
(0.014) 
-0.043 0.006 
0.043 
(0.002) 
0.041 0.046 
0.023 
(0.097) 
-0.758 0.887 
2009 
-0.186 
(0.013) 
-0.205 -0.168 
0.043 
(0.003) 
0.039 0.049 
0.015 
(0.113) 
-1.022 0.575 
2010 
0.119 
(0.002) 
0.116 0.122 
0.045 
(0.007) 
0.035 0.057 
-0.006 
(0.102) 
-0.924 0.452 
2011 
0.191 
(0.008) 
0.176 0.201 
0.045 
(0.006) 
0.037 0.052 
-0.013 
(0.106) 
-0.857 0.596 
2012 -0.003 
(0.006) 
-0.010 0.008 
0.042 
(0.004) 
0.037 0.047 
0.011 
(0.074) 
-0.631 0.374 
2013 
0.117 
(0.002) 
0.114 0.120 
0.044 
(0.002) 
0.041 0.048 
0.006 
(0.070) 
-0.547 0.633 
2014 
0.155 
(0.004) 
0.152 0.165 
0.044 
(0.001) 
0.042 0.046 
-0.004 
(0.076) 
-0.642 0.606 
2015 
0.024 
(0.008) 
0.019 0.043 
0.042 
(0.002) 
0.040 0.045 
0.012 
(0.067) 
-0.477 0.382 
2016 
-0.019 
(0.005) 
-0.024 -0.010 
0.042 
(0.002) 
0.038 0.044 
0.013 
(0.056) 
-0.262 0.289 
2017 
0.122 
(0.005) 
0.116 0.129 
0.044 
(0.002) 
0.040 0.048 
0.001 
(0.068) 
-0.410 0.957 
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Table 4.8 
 
Descriptive Statistics for Ten-Year Average Combined Return, Spending, and 
Measurement Error Rates by Institutional Control and Ten-Year Average Actual 
Endowment FMV Quartile, Adjusted for Inflation to 2017 Dollar Value 
Variable Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
All 
Institutions 
0.0115 0.0102 0.0304 -0.1322 0.1619 
Institutional 
Control      
Private, not-
for-profit 
0.0070 0.0061 0.0290 -0.1322 0.1159 
Public,  
4-year 
0.0159 0.0142 0.0277 -0.0719 0.1274 
Public,  
2-year 
0.0199 0.0179 0.0471 -0.0851 0.1619 
Endowment 
Size 
     
Quartile 1 0.0127 0.0121 0.0379 -0.1322 0.1619 
Quartile 2 0.0078 0.0056 0.0323 -0.0859 0.1274 
Quartile 3 0.0092 0.0046 0.0265 -0.0772 0.0957 
Quartile 4 0.0162 0.0143 0.0220 -0.0529 0.1095 
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Figure 4. Endowment growth components, adjusted for inflation to 2017 dollar value, by 
fiscal year.  
 
The remaining categorical variables provide additional insights into endowment 
characteristics that may cause dispersion in tax policy impact by contextualizing the size 
and contribution variables. Extending the endowment size measure, the ten-year average 
FMV is allocated to the FTE student enrollment, resulting in an endowment FMV per 
student variable. Table 4.9 presents the descriptive statistics for this measure and the 
categorical variable is based on the quartile. The data is skewed with a larger than 
expected range. The minimum value, $64 per FTE, is reported by the sample’s smallest 
endowment, Nashville State Community College. Seventeen of the twenty lowest FMV 
per FTE institutions are two-year publics. A low-enrollment institution, University of 
Texas Health Center at Tyler, represents the largest value. The institution enrolls graduate 
students only and reported an average of five FTE students over the observed period. The 
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next largest FMV per FTE institution, University of Texas MD Anderson Cancer Center, 
is not exclusively a graduate school but is lower-enrollment with an average of 270 FTE 
students. The remaining seven institutions reporting FMV per FTE over $1,000,000 
include the expected endowments: Princeton University, Yale University, Harvard 
University, Stanford University, Swarthmore College, MIT, and Amherst College. 
Sixteen of the twenty highest FMV per FTE institutions are private colleges and 
universities. Endowment size quartiles fairly align with the FMV per FTE quartiles. 
Relative contribution size quartiles reveal endowments with less reliance on contributions 
have higher FMVs per FTE. 
The final categorical variable is derived from a measure of contributions as a 
portion of the endowment size. Gifts to endowment for the ten-year period, inflation-
adjusted to 2017 dollar value, were combined and calculated as a percentage of the 2017 
endowment FMV. This is intended to be a proxy for the reliance on contributions to grow 
the endowment. Table 4.10 presents the descriptive statistics for this measure and the 
categorical variable is based on the quartile. As previously noted, three institutions 
reported no contributions over the ten-year period of observation. Austin Peay State 
University reported the highest value, 98.19%, with unusually large giving recorded in 
2015 and 2016. Only two other entities, Chattanooga State Community College and 
Trident Technical College, reported contributions of more than 75% of the 2017 FMV 
and both hold relatively small endowments. Harvard University reported the highest 
dollar value of contributions in seven of the ten observed years, but those contributions 
reflect only 9.7% of the endowment’s 2017 FMV. Other large-gift universities report 
similar percentages: Stanford University, 9.67% and MIT, 10.69%. The variable is 
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associated with endowment size as larger endowments reflect lower percentages of 
contributions based on endowment FMV. The variable descriptive statistics reflect this in 
both of the endowment size quartile sets. 
Table 4.9 
 
Descriptive Statistics for Ten-Year Average Actual FMV per Ten-year Average FTE 
Student Enrollment by Quartile, Institutional Control, Ten-Year Average Actual 
Endowment FMV Quartile, and Ten-Year Endowment Contributions as a Percentage of 
2017 Endowment FMV Quartile, Adjusted for Inflation to 2017 Dollar Value 
Variable Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
All Institutions 107,308 23,614 423,483 67 8,681,842 
Endowment Size, 
FMV per Student 
     
Quartile 1 2,922 2,886 1,468 67 5,690 
Quartile 2 12,953 11,423 5,459 5,724 23,547 
Quartile 3 41,027 38,632 12,754 23,735 69,990 
Quartile 4 372,328 183,187 790,875 71,905 8,681,842 
Institutional Control      
Private, not-for-profit 147,906 52,164 260,441 3,312 2,490,428 
Public, 4-year 72,604 7,005 590,383 470 8,681,842 
Public, 2-year 1,812 1,332 1,332 67 5,680 
Endowment Size, 
FMV 
     
Quartile 1 9,096 3,517 38,594 67 489,301 
Quartile 2 78,448 14,094 681,007 1,277 8,681,842 
Quartile 3 68,199 46,699 72,083 2,882 398,805 
Quartile 4 273,487 115,834 458,658 10,633 4,037,595 
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Table 4.9 (Continued) 
	
Variable Mean Median Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Relative Contribution 
Size      
Quartile 1 286,602 59,122 810,589 678 8,681,842 
Quartile 2 77,112 39,091 97,825 214 518,250 
Quartile 3 40,524 17,993 73,716 244 589,320 
Quartile 4 24,993 5,941 63,766 67 489,301 
 
Table 4.10 
 
Descriptive Statistics for Ten-Year Endowment Contributions as a Percentage of 2017 
Endowment FMV by Quartile, Institutional Control, Ten-Year Average Actual 
Endowment FMV Quartile, and Ten-Year Average Actual Endowment FMV per Ten-Year 
Average FTE Student Enrollment Quartile, Adjusted for Inflation to 2017 Dollar Value 
Variable Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
All Institutions 0.2492 0.2296 0.1413 – 0.9819 
Relative Contribution 
Size 
     
Quartile 1 0.0933 0.0978 0.0362 – 0.1451 
Quartile 2 0.1858 0.1872 0.0235 0.1455 0.2310 
Quartile 3 0.2779 0.2788 0.0271 0.2312 0.3311 
Quartile 4 0.4454 0.4190 0.1032 0.3331 0.9819 
Institutional Control      
Private, not-for-profit 0.2088 0.1862 0.1171 0.0176 0.7146 
Public, 4-year 0.2904 0.2813 0.1412 – 0.9819 
Public, 2-year 0.3139 0.3134 0.2072 – 0.8498 
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Table 4.10 (Continued)  
Variable Mean Median Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Endowment Size, 
FMV      
Quartile 1 0.3259 0.3100 0.1735 – 0.9819 
Quartile 2 0.2631 0.2509 0.1274 0.0290 0.6305 
Quartile 3 0.2268 0.1986 0.1185 0.0176 0.7146 
Quartile 4 0.1808 0.1632 0.0925 0.0198 0.4580 
Endowment Size, 
FMV per Student 
     
Quartile 1 0.3325 0.3201 0.1681 – 0.9819 
Quartile 2 0.2613 0.2546 0.1205 – 0.6160 
Quartile 3 0.2385 0.2260 0.1250 0.0139 0.7146 
Quartile 4 0.1643 0.1487 0.0859 0.0176 0.4281 
 
Results 
The first research question of this study sought to quantify the long-run impact of 
a consistent and sustained reduction in giving to endowments. To simulate the scenario, 
historical results from a ten-year period, 2008 to 2017, were used both as a comparison 
point and test dataset. The expected reduction in contributions from the recently enacted 
TCJA was applied to the historical data, simulating the impact had the TCJA been 
effective as of fiscal year 2008. Endowment asset values at the end of the ten-year period 
were used to quantify the wealth impact of the reduced contributions resulting from the 
tax policy. 
Figure 5 depicts trendlines for both the actual and predicted average endowment 
FMV from 2008 to 2017. The dips and peaks of the stock market and the overall growth 
in endowment wealth is reflected. The variance is visible on the graph beginning in 2011 
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and grows throughout the remaining period. As noted in Table 4.11, in the first year the 
variance between actual and predicted average endowment is 0.09% and increases an 
average of 0.076% each year to a difference of 0.77% in the tenth year. Examining the 
higher education sector as a whole, the difference of less than 1% after a decade is, 
arguably, immaterial. The variance in actual and predicted endowment FMV fits the 
linear equation !" = 0.01804 + 0.07611,. Using the linear equation, Table 4.12 projects 
the variance for extended periods after the tax policy implementation. Twenty years post-
implementation is projected to result in a variance of 1.54% and growing to 3.82% after 
fifty years. The slow deterioration in endowment wealth allows an opportunity for higher 
education to implement strategies to combat the loss in revenue. Subsectors are now 
examined to determine if the impact is consistent throughout higher education or if select 
institutions are predicted to experience different trends. Table 4.13 summarizes the 
subsectors examined based on institutional control, endowment size, and relative 
contribution size. 
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Figure 5. Average actual and predicted ending endowment FMV, adjusted for inflation to 
2017 dollar value, by fiscal year-end.  
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Table 4.11 
 
Actual and Predicted Average Endowment FMV by Fiscal Year, Adjusted for Inflation to 
2017 Dollar Value 
Fiscal Year Actual Mean Predicted Mean Variance 
2008 616,504,701 615,940,346 0.0915% 
2009 487,123,022 486,344,191 0.1599% 
2010 521,571,837 520,292,353 0.2453% 
2011 592,020,028 590,056,561 0.3317% 
2012 578,589,452 576,269,756 0.4009% 
2013 623,103,239 620,110,746 0.4803% 
2014 705,626,051 701,665,712 0.5613% 
2015 727,834,200 723,266,847 0.6275% 
2016 702,310,826 697,432,908 0.6946% 
2017 756,629,401 750,778,964 0.7732% 
 
 
 
Table 4.12 
 
Projected Variance of Actual to Predicted Endowment FMV by Years from Tax Policy 
Implementation 
Year Variance 
10 0.7732% 
20 1.5402% 
30 2.3013% 
40 3.0624% 
50 3.8235% 
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Table 4.13 
 
Actual and Predicted Average Endowment 2017 FMV by Institutional Control, Ten-Year 
Average Actual Endowment FMV Quartile, Ten-Year Average Actual Endowment FMV 
per Ten-Year Average FTE Student Quartile, and Ten-Year Average Endowment 
Contributions as a Percentage of 2017 Endowment FMV Quartile, Adjusted for Inflation 
to 2017 Dollar Value 
Variable Actual Mean Predicted Mean Variance 
All Institutions 756,629,401 750,778,964 0.7732% 
Institutional Control    
Private, not-for-
profit 
1,020,077,358 1,013,195,552 0.6746% 
Public, 4-year 541,341,116 535,878,219 1.0091% 
Public, 2-year 12,624,909 12,418,896 1.6318% 
Endowment Size, 
FMV 
   
Quartile 1 22,795,284 22,418,382 1.6534% 
Quartile 2 71,880,843 70,934,609 1.3164% 
Quartile 3 224,153,899 221,668,647 1.1087% 
Quartile 4 2,707,687,580 2,688,094,220 0.7236% 
Endowment Size, 
FMV Per Student    
Quartile 1 42,295,210 41,548,910 1.7645% 
Quartile 2 158,000,000 155,800,000 1.3924% 
Quartile 3 462,200,000 457,000,000 1.1251% 
Quartile 4 2,364,000,000 2,349,000,000 0.6345% 
Relative Contribution 
Size 
   
Quartile 1 1,851,330,175 1,842,170,366 0.4948% 
Quartile 2 590,815,929 585,314,098 0.9312% 
Quartile 3 464,945,501 458,557,957 1.3738% 
Quartile 4 119,426,001 117,073,436 1.9699% 
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Table 4.13 reports the tenth-year variance by categorical variables and Figures 6 
through 9 present the ratio of predicted-to-actual average endowment FMVs with 
trendlines. The base year, 2007, is included in the graphs to demonstrate an equal ratio 
for the year prior to the simulated tax policy implementation. All the graphs illustrate a 
continuing negative change year-over-year. Examining the reported variances by 
institutional control in Table 4.13, public, two-year institutions are predicted to have the 
greatest variance by 2017, 1.63%. Private institutions have the lowest variance with 
0.68% and four-year publics are predicted to have a 1.01% variance by 2017. Figure 6 
disaggregates the ten-year trendlines by institutional control. The 2017 predicted-to-
actual average endowment FMV ratio is 0.9923 for all institutions in the sample. Private 
institutions are predicted to experience a gradually increasing variance that is relatively 
smooth over the observed period. Four-year publics similarly reflect a gradual decline but 
at a faster descent. Two-year publics are predicted to experience a much more drastic 
decline over the decade. 
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Figure 6. Ratio of predicted to actual average endowment FMV, adjusted for inflation to 
2017 dollar value, by fiscal year-end. 
The variances are inversely related to endowment size, measured in both total 
FMV and as FMV per full-time equivalent student enrollment. For total FMV, the largest 
quartile has the lowest variance, 0.72%, and the smallest quartile has the highest 
variance, 1.65%. The trendline results are disaggregated by the ten-year average 
endowment FMV quartiles in Figure 7. Lower balance endowments are predicted to 
experience the greatest variance in the predicted-to-actual ratio. Quartiles one and two 
experience steady decreases, ending the decade with ratios of 0.9832 and 0.9865, 
respectively. Quartile three experiences a less consistent decline with a slowdown in the 
pace in years of economic downturn. The largest endowments, quartile four, is the least 
volatile and has a ratio of 0.9924 at the end of 2017. Figure 8 presents the trendline 
results by ten-year average endowment FMV per ten-year average student enrollment 
with similar outcomes. Endowments with larger FMVs per student are predicted to 
experience the least variance. Quartiles one, three, and four experience steady declines 
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over the decade but quartile two is less consistent. The smallest endowment per student, 
quartile one, end the predicted decade with a ratio of 0.9824. 
Public two-year institutions are almost exclusively represented in the smallest 
quartile of both endowment size measures. Figure 2 demonstrated the distribution of 
endowment FMV quartiles by institutional control. The distribution for endowment FMV 
per FTE is even more skewed between public and private entities. Quartile one is 96% 
publics and quartile four is 90% privates. Institutions with large endowments, which 
includes many private entities, are projected to have the ability to strategize against the 
slow deterioration of the endowment wealth. Lower balance endowments, which includes 
most public two-year institutions, are projected to experience an accelerated deterioration 
with less reaction time.  
	
Figure 7. Ratio of predicted to actual average endowment FMV, adjusted for inflation to 
2017 dollar value, by fiscal year-end. Quartiles based on ten-year average actual FMV. 
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Figure 8. Ratio of predicted to actual average endowment FMV, adjusted for inflation to 
2017 dollar value, by fiscal year-end. Quartiles based on ten-year average actual FMV 
per ten-year average full-time equivalent enrollment. 
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Endowments with greater relative contribution levels experience the highest 
variance of any subsector examined. At the end of the tenth year, quartile four is 
predicted to have a 1.97% variance as compared to 0.49% for quartile one. Trendlines for 
contributions as a percentage of the endowment quartiles are depicted in Figure 9. The 
simulated tax policy influences contributions and is expected to have the greatest impact 
on endowments with higher reliance on giving, as compared to net return, to grow the 
endowment. Figure 9 reveals that quartile one endowments, with low percentages of ten-
years gifts as a percentage of 2017 endowment FMV, are projected to have a predicted-
to-actual ratio of 0.9951 in 2017. Quartile four endowments, with large gift-to-FMV 
percentages, are predicted to have the lowest predicted-to-actual ratio of 0.9801. 
Endowments with significant reliance on contributions for growth are projected to have 
the shortest reaction time to the implemented tax policy. 
Figure 9. Ratio of predicted to actual average endowment FMV, adjusted for inflation to 
2017 dollar value, by fiscal year-end. Quartiles based on total contributions to 
endowment for 2008 to 2017 as a percentage of 2017 actual ending FMV. 
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Research Question Two 
Descriptive Statistics 
This section provides descriptive statistics for the second research question. Table 
4.14 displays the mean, median, standard deviation, minimum, and maximum of the full 
sample for each continuous variable. The proportion of endowment contributions from 
individuals average 66% and range from zero to 100%. Two entities reported no gifts 
from individuals to the endowment. Kent State University in Ohio reported $50,000 in 
endowment contributions in 2017, all from corporate gifts. Likewise, Leeward 
Community College in Hawaii reported $10,000 in corporate gifts to the endowment and 
no other contributions. Nine institutions, four of which are community colleges, reported 
all endowment contributions were from individuals in 2017. As a point of interest, Yale 
University reported 38% of endowment gifts from individuals and University of 
Kentucky reported 68%. 
Endowment size is measured by the FMV at the end of fiscal year 2017. The 
variable is heavily skewed as evidenced by the difference in the mean and median, $667 
million for the former and $109 million for the latter. The smallest endowment in the 
sample with a reported FMV of $228,000 is held by Leeward Community College. Yale 
University represents the largest endowment in the sample at $27 billion. The sample 
includes 77 institutions with reported endowments over $1 billion and only three under 
$1 million. The four smallest endowments all belong to community colleges. 
Institution size measured by student enrollment, also skewed, ranges from 354 
FTE students enrolled to over 60,000. Thirty-one entities in the sample report under 
1,000 FTE students and all but one (Kauai Community College) are private institutions. 
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By contrast, forty institutions report over 30,000 FTE students enrolled and only two 
(University of Southern California and New York University) are privates. While not 
included in the regression analysis, endowment FMV per FTE student enrollment also 
clumps institutions by control at the tails. The 50 largest FMV-per-student endowments 
belong to private colleges and universities. The 80 smallest belong to publics. The range 
was $52 per student to $2.9 million per student; Princeton University is at the top with 
Yale not far behind at $2.2 million per student. 
The percentage of enrolled students awarded Pell Grant aid averaged 29% with a 
standard deviation of 12%. The low end of the range is populated by expensive, private 
institutions. Franklin W. Olin College of Engineering, a special focus college, and Elon 
University report only 8% of students were awarded a Pell Grant in 2017. At the other 
end of the range is Berea College, a well-known institution in endowment discussions. 
The small, private college in Kentucky has one of the largest endowments (over $1 
billion in 2017 and $704,000 per student) and primarily serves low-income students, as 
evidenced by the reported 82% that received a Pell Grant in 2017. 
Published tuition and fees variables reflect either the in-state or out-of-state rates 
for public institutions. In-state rates display greater variance and out-of-state rates have a 
higher mean and median. Thirty-four institutions publish in-state rates at or below $5,500 
and 28 of those institutions are community colleges. Only two colleges in the sample 
publish out-of-state rates below $5,500, but the lowest rates are still primarily held by 
community colleges. Columbia University reports the highest published tuition and fees 
for both the in-state and the out-of-state data. Columbia University is a private institution 
and reports the same rate for in-state and out-of-state, but this highlights that no public 
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institution surpasses that rate with the out-of-state rates. The highest published out-of-
state tuition and fees for a public institution is reported by University of Virginia at 
$45,756, the 102nd highest rate in the sample. For in-state rates, College of William and 
Mary has the highest published rate of public institutions at $21,234 and is the 322nd 
highest of the full sample. 
Table 4.14 
Descriptive Statistics of Continuous Variables, Full Sample 
Variable Mean Median Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Percentage of 
Endowment 
Contributions 
from 
Individuals 
66.095 69.218 22.436 – 100.000 
Endowment 
Size, FMV 
(millions) 
667.469 108.664 2,235.683 0.228 27,176.040 
FTE Student 
Enrollment 
(000s) 
9.511 4.836 10.715 0.354 60.310 
Percentage 
awarded Pell 
Grants 
29.310 28.000 12.258 8.000 82.000 
Published 
Tuition & Fees, 
In-State (000s) 
25.007 25.680 16.695 3.054 55.056 
Published 
Tuition & Fees, 
Out-of-State 
(000s) 
30.787 30.802 12.452 5.060 55.056 
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The remaining variables are categorical and disaggregate the sample in Table 
4.15. The variables denote if institutions are private and include a hospital, by Carnegie 
Classification grouping. The overall private and public institutional control is fairly 
evenly split, aligning with the higher education population noted in earlier sections of this 
dissertation. The institutional control split is not even at the Carnegie Classification level, 
with the exception of master’s universities. Baccalaureate institutions are primarily 
private and doctoral institutions are primarily public. The sample includes only public 
associate’s and private special focus four-year entities. The largest groups consist of 
institutions that are classified as baccalaureate, master’s, and doctoral without a hospital, 
over 87% of the sample. Only one institution includes a hospital without doctoral 
classification and just below 6% of the sample have both. 
 
Table 4.15 
 
Frequency Distribution of Categorical Variables 
Categories Private, 
 No Hospital 
Private,  
With 
Hospital 
Public,  
No Hospital 
Public, 
With 
Hospital 
Observations 
Associate’s – – 35 – 35 
Baccalaureate 159 – 16 – 175 
Master’s 104 1 99 – 204 
Doctoral 52 8 118 27 205 
Special Focus 
Four-Year 4 – – – 4 
Observations 319 9 268 27 623 
 
  
123 
Table 4.16 provides the median and interquartile ranges, preferred when skewness 
is present, of the continuous variables for the full sample and the subcategories. 
Descriptive statistics for percentage of endowment contributions from individuals are 
fairly consistent across the subcategories with the exception of the somewhat lower 
medians reported by doctoral institutions and those that include a hospital, which are 
consistent with each other. Endowment size is much more varied, especially in the 
significantly higher medians reported by doctoral institutions, special focus four-year 
institutions, and those that include a hospital. The significantly lower median and range 
for associate’s colleges is also noteworthy. Institution size measured by FTE student 
enrollment is, again, higher for the doctoral and hospital inclusive institutions. Not 
surprisingly, significant differences are noted between the private and public entities. 
Percentage of students awarded a Pell Grant is more consistent across the subcategories, 
with publics reporting the highest median and privates reporting the lowest median. 
While representing the two smallest samples, the difference in medians and ranges of 
associate’s colleges and special focus four-year institutions is alarming, but not 
surprising. Tuition and fees reflect more consistency across the subcategories with out-of-
state rates in comparison to in-state. The greatest difference in medians and ranges is 
reflected in institutional control and is reiterated based on the Carnegie Classification 
groupings. 
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Table 4.16 
Median and Interquartile Ranges of Continuous Variables by Categories 
Variable N 
Percentage of 
Endowment 
Contributions 
from 
Individuals 
Endowment 
Size, FMV 
(millions) 
FTE 
Student 
Enrollment 
(000s) 
Percentage 
awarded 
Pell 
Grants 
Published 
Tuition & 
Fees, 
In-State 
(000s) 
Published 
Tuition & 
Fees, 
Out-of-
State 
(000s) 
Full Sample 623 
69.2 
(50.7-84.5) 
108.66 
(43.88-
421.89) 
4.8 
(2.2-12.7) 
28 
(19-38) 
25.7 
(8.4-
40.2) 
30.8 
(20.2-
40.8) 
Private 328 
72.5 
(52.9-85.9) 
156.10 
(61.68-
504.25) 
2.4 
(1.6-4.2) 
23 
(16-31) 
39.6 
(32.7-
47.6) 
39.6 
(32.7-
47.6) 
Public 295 
66.9 
(48.3-81.7) 
73.82 
(26.66-
304.54) 
11.6 
(6.0-22.9) 
34 
(26-41) 
8.3 
(6.9-
10.6) 
20.0 
(17.1-
25.4) 
Hospital 36 62.2 
(48.5-68.5) 
1,175 
(592.5-
2,745.5) 
24.3 
(16.2-
33.3) 
24 
(18-34) 
13.4 
(9.4-
27.8) 
32.3 
(26.3-
41.4) 
No Hospital 587 
70.1 
(51.2-85.2) 
99 
(41-318) 
4.3 
(2.1-10.9) 
28 
(20-38) 
27.3 
(8.3-
40.3) 
30.8 
(19.7-
40.8) 
Associate’s 35 
67.3 
(52.6-89.0) 
8 
(5-22) 
4.2 
(2.1-6.4) 
34 
(28-39) 
4.7 
(3.9-5.4) 
9.1 
(8.2-
12.2) 
Baccalaureate 175 
75.5 
(56.5-87.6) 
138 
(53-377) 
1.8 
(1.2-2.3) 
24 
(17-35) 
40.2 
(31.6-
48.8) 
40.2 
(31.6-
48.8) 
Master’s 204 
76.2 
(51.1-87.2) 
56 
(31-98) 
4.8 
(3.0-8.1) 
31 
(25-39) 
20.6 
(7.9-
33.7) 
24.8 
(17.9-
33.7) 
Doctoral 205 
61.4 
(47.6-74.6) 
476 
(153-
1,259) 
18.1 
(10.2-
26.1) 
26 
(18-36) 
11.7 
(8.7-
38.5) 
28.9 
(22.5-
40.8) 
Special Focus 
Four-Year 
4 
64.6 
(38.2-78.0) 
353 
(268-
383.5) 
2.4 
(1.3-2.7) 
13.5 
(10.5-15) 
47.7 
(46.7-
49.1) 
47.7 
(46.7-
49.1) 
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Results 
Before considering a multivariate model for the percentage of endowment 
contributions from individuals, each independent variable was tested in a bivariate 
regression and tested for heteroskadasticity. Table 4.17 presents the results for each 
independent variable. Five variables are not statistically significant in the bivariate model 
and are eliminated for inclusion in the multivariate model. Issues were previously noted 
with the in-state tuition and fees variable related to bimodal distribution and high 
correlation with institutional control. While the out-of-state tuition and fees variable is 
not bimodal, the variable still exhibits high correlation with the institutional control 
variable. The institutional control, public or private, can be predicted with 91.7% 
accuracy based on the in-state tuition and fees rate and with 73.9% accuracy based on 
out-of-state rate.  
The percentage of enrolled students awarded Pell Grants is also found to not be 
statistically significant. Greater need-based aid was expected to negatively impact 
individual giving to endowments. One case that serves as an example contradicting this 
reasoning is Berea College with 98% of endowment giving originating from individuals 
and 82% of enrolled students awarded Pell Grant aid in 2017. The indicator variables for 
associate’s colleges and four-year special focus Institutions Carnegie Classifications are 
not statistically significant and represent a small portion of the sample. Baccalaureate and 
master’s indicators are positively correlated with percentage of endowment gifts from 
individuals. The institutional control variable is positively correlated with percentage of 
endowment gifts from individuals when indicating a private college or university. The 
126 
remaining variables, indicator for doctoral institution, inclusion of a hospital, endowment 
size, and student enrollment, are negatively correlated in the bivariate models. 
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Table 4.17 
Bivariate Ordinary Least Squares Regression Results for Percentage of Endowment Contributions from Individuals 
Private Hospital Doctoral Associate’s Bac- calaureate Master’s 
Four-
Year 
Special 
Focus 
Endow-
ment 
Size 
(Log) 
Student 
Enroll-
ment 
(Log) 
Pell 
Grants 
(Log) 
Tuition 
& Fees, 
In-State 
Tuition & 
Fees, Out-
of-State 
Intercept 63.377 (1.352) 
66.545 
(0.941) 
68.997 
(1.114) 
66.032 
(0.917) 
64.447 
(1.073) 
64.974 
(1.070) 
66.147 
(0.901) 
75.150 
(2.666) 
72.989 
(1.591) 
58.502 
(6.763) 
64.263 
(1.619) 
66.623 
(2.400) 
Coefficient 5.163* (1.797) 
-7.791*
(2.451)
-8.820*
(1.817)
1.118 
(4.448) 
5.869* 
(1.928) 
3.424^ 
(1.955) 
-8.077
(12.835)
-1.854*
(0.515)
-4.137*
(0.795)
2.311 
(2.040) 
0.073 
(0.054) 
-0.017
(0.072)
R2 0.013 0.016 0.034 0.000 0.014 0.005 0.000 0.021 0.042 0.002 0.003 0.000 
Root MSE 22.305 22.380 22.067 22.453 22.298 22.396 22.445 22.223 21.981 22.431 22.421 22.453 
Notes: ^Significant at 10%; †Significant at 5%; *Significant at 1%. Robust standard errors are provided in parentheses. 
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Table 4.18 provides the correlation matrix for the variables used in this study. As 
expected, private institutional control is negatively correlated with the doctoral indicator, 
master’s indicator, inclusion of a hospital indicator, and logarithm of student enrollment, 
but positively correlated with the baccalaureate indicator and logarithm of endowment 
size. Inclusion of a hospital is positively correlated with the doctoral indicator, 
endowment size, and student enrollment. Endowment size is negatively correlated with 
the master’s indicator. Both the logarithm of FTE student enrollment and the logarithm of 
endowment FMV have high correlation with multiple variables. Higher endowment 
FMVs tend to belong to doctoral institutions. Institutions with larger student enrollments 
tend to be public universities and doctoral institutions. Economies of scale may be at play 
as more tuition-paying students are needed to support the large-scale operations. State 
appropriations, while no longer a major revenue source, may have historically been the 
impetus for high enrollments either out of obligation or luxury.  
Additional testing performed on the regression models indicate potential 
concerns. The variance inflation factors indicate potential multicollinearity issues and the 
correlation matrix of coefficients confirms concerns with the institutional control 
indicator, logarithm of FTE student enrollment, and each of the Carnegie Classification 
indicators. Six different regression models are considered and by dropping one or more 
variables the multicollinearity issue may be alleviated. Increasing the sample size is not 
an option due to lack of additional observation availability. 
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Table 4.18 
Correlation Matrix for Observed Variables 
Variables 
Percentage of 
Contributions, 
Individuals 
Private Hospital Doctoral Baccalaureate Master’s Endowment 
Size (Log) 
Student 
Enrollment 
(Log) 
Percentage of 
Contributions, 
Individuals 
1.000 
Private 0.115 1.000 
Hospital -0.081 -0.137 1.000 
Doctoral -0.190 -0.328 0.339 1.000 
Baccalaureate 0.118 0.478 -0.155 -0.438 1.000 
Master’s 0.072 -0.017 -0.158 -0.489 -0.436 1.000 
Endowment 
Size (Log) 
-0.143 0.222 0.322 0.517 0.001 -0.329 1.000 
Student 
Enrollment 
(Log) -0.204 -0.630 0.329 0.699 -0.656 -0.023 0.381 1.000 
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Using ordinary least squares regression, six models are considered to identify 
characteristics of endowments with greater reliance on individual giving. The results of 
the estimating equations are presented in Table 4.19. The first model uses the institutional 
control and hospital indicators. Model two builds on the first model with the addition of 
the endowment size measure. The third, fourth, and fifth models add the doctoral, 
baccalaureate, and master’s indicator variables, respectively. The sixth model 
incorporates the enrollment size measure. Independent variables were log-transformed to 
address heteroscedasticity and residuals were inspected to check for the assumption of 
normality of error terms. 
The low R2s and lack of statistical significance demonstrate the lack of 
explanation provided by any of the models. While model six results in the highest R2, all 
independent variables lose statistical significance. The previously noted concerns with 
multicollinearity are more likely to be alleviated with the more simplistic models. Model 
three explains 4.7% of the variance in proportions of endowment gifts by individuals and 
two variables, institutional control and logarithm of endowment FMV, are statistically 
significant with 95% confidence. Model two explains a slightly lower 4.3% of the 
variance and the same two variables are statistically significant but at the higher 99% 
confidence. The variance inflation factors for each model do not indicate 
multicollinearity issues, but the correlation matrix of coefficients for model three 
reaffirms concerns with the doctoral classification indicator. For these reasons, model 
two is the preferred model. 
Model two estimates with 99% confidence that, on average, private institutions 
have a 6.9% higher proportion of endowments gifts from individuals than public 
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institutions, controlling for hospital inclusion and endowment size. Institutions with 
hospitals, on average, have a 0.3% lower proportion of endowments gifts from 
individuals than institutions without hospitals, controlling for institutional control and 
endowment size. However, this estimate lacks statistical significance. The model 
estimates with 99% confidence that endowment size, on average, decreases the 
proportion of endowments gifts from individuals, controlling for institutional control and 
hospital inclusion. 
The preferred model was used to regress the dataset by subsamples of the 
Carnegie Classification groupings: doctoral, master’s, baccalaureate, special focus four-
year, and associate’s colleges. The regression omitted variables because of collinearity 
and the remaining variables lack statistical significance with the associate’s colleges 
sample and the special focus universities sample. The regression of the baccalaureate 
sample omitted the hospital indicator, but the endowment size variable is statistically 
significant with 99% confidence that the logarithm of the endowment FMV is negatively 
correlated with the proportion of endowment gifts from individuals. All variables lose 
statistical significance with the doctoral sample. The master’s sample estimates, with 
99% confidence, that inclusion of a hospital increases, on average, the proportion of 
endowment gifts from individuals by 15.6% when controlling for institutional control and 
endowment size. The regression results for each of the subsamples are available upon 
request. 
  
132	
Table 4.19 
Ordinary Least Squares Regression Results for Percentage of Endowment Contributions from Individuals 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Private 
4.753* 
(1.828) 
6.899* 
(1.832) 
5.269† 
(2.150) 
4.719† 
(2.262) 
4.497^ 
(2.301) 
1.964 
(3.180) 
Hospital -6.396†
(2.513)
-0.311
(2.897)
0.380 
(2.897) 
0.467 
(2.907) 
0.588 
(2.904) 
0.857 
(2.921) 
Endowment Size 
(Log) 
-2.282*
(0.609)
-1.663†
(0.761)
-1.740†
(0.766)
-1.861†
(0.752)
-1.334
(0.930)
Doctoral 
-3.881
(2.671)
-3.114
(2.862)
-0.041
(4.883)
1.836 
(5.311) 
Baccalaureate 
1.977 
(2.391) 
5.053 
(4.800) 
4.100 
(4.757) 
Master’s 
3.386 
(4.566) 
4.399 
(4.748) 
Student 
Enrollment (Log) 
-2.254
(2.032)
Intercept 
63.962 
(1.432) 
73.628 
(3.195) 
72.699 
(3.286) 
72.549 
(3.291) 
70.267 
(4.840) 
72.084 
(4.739) 
R2 0.018 0.043 0.047 0.048 0.049 0.051 
Root MSE 22.274 22.000 21.978 21.984 21.989 21.981 
Notes: ^Significant at 10%; †Significant at 5%; *Significant at 1%. Robust standard errors are provided in 
parentheses. 
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Interpretation and Discussion of Findings 
Examining the impact to the endowment wealth base, the erosion is not material 
for the overall higher education sector. Endowments with greater relative contribution 
levels experience the largest erosion of any subsector examined. Individual institutions, 
however, will experience various levels of erosion. Nevertheless, the institution with the 
sample’s greatest predicted erosion would experience less than 4% of variation in the 
endowment base after a decade of reduced giving. Even though sustained loss of 
contributions to endowments for any reason will result in wealth erosion, this study’s 
context was a tax policy that increased the tax price of giving for individual taxpayers. 
Identification of institutional sectors or characteristics with greater reliance on 
endowment contributions from individual taxpayers and, therefore, at greater risk for 
significant levels of erosion, provides limited insights. The regression results indicate 
private institutions and institutions with smaller endowments measured by FMV are 
correlated with larger proportions of endowment gifts from contributions by individuals. 
The erosion of overall endowment wealth is gradual, with each thirteen-year 
period adding a percentage of predicated variance impact. Subsectors of higher education 
are predicted to experience different rates of attrition. The variances are greater for two-
year publics, endowments with relatively small FMVs, and endowments with greater 
reliance on contributions to build the base over the observed decade. Two extreme cases 
highlight the individual endowment experiences. Trident Technical College (Trident) is a 
two-year public institution in Charleston, South Carolina. Trident’s endowment had FMV 
average of $2.15 million over the observed decade, $2.67 million at the end of 2017, and 
$224 endowment FMV per student – a relatively small endowment for the higher 
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education sector. Contributions over the ten-year period accounted for 76% of the 2017 
FMV, indicating a high reliance on gifts to build endowment wealth. Trident distributed 
more than the investment return based on the ten-year average combined rates of -2.6%. 
The prediction model estimates Trident’s endowment base will be 3.47% lower a decade 
post-implementation of the TCJA, over four times more than overall higher education 
endowments. Grinnell College, a private not-for-profit institution in Iowa, is predicted to 
have much less of an impact on endowment wealth. Grinnell’s endowment is relatively 
large with a ten-year average of $1.6 billion FMV, $1.87 billion at the end of 2017, and 
$979,389 endowment FMV per student. Contributions over the previous decade 
accounted for less than 2% of the FMV and the ten-year average combined rates of return 
and spending is 1.3%, indicating return exceeded disbursements. The prediction model 
estimates Grinnell’s endowment base will be 0.11% lower following ten years of TCJA.  
Two median institutions demonstrate how different profiles can result in similar 
experiences. State University of New York College of Technology at Canton (Canton) 
and University of Alabama (UA) are both four-year public entities that are predicted to 
have 1.18% lower endowment base ten years after the implementation of the TCJA. UA 
has a larger endowment, $824 million in 2017 and $24,216 per student as compared to 
Canton’s $12 million endowment and $3,526 per student. Contributions over the previous 
decade accounted for 25% of UA’s endowment and 26% of Canton’s endowment FMV 
at the end of 2017. UA, however, has an average combined return and spending rate of 
2.22% while Canton’s average is -2.02%. UA built wealth over the decade by not 
disbursing more than return but Canton disbursed more than the return. The individual 
cases illuminate endowments will vary in levels of concern and reactions. 
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Early endowment theory views these entities as financial buffers or precautionary 
savings vehicles (Fisman & Hubbard, 2003; Hansmann, 1990; Helms et al., 2005). More 
recent research on operating behavior disputes the savings theory. Brown et al. (2010) 
found universities responded to the financial shock of the burst technology bubble by 
reducing operating expenses and cutting endowment payout rates. The Center for Social 
Philanthropy Tellus Institute (2011) documented canceled projects and loss of jobs in 
response to the Great Recession. The TCJA is expected to decrease all contributions and 
may be viewed as a financial shock requiring strategic shifting. While Dahiya and 
Yermack (2018) note many endowments are building purchasing power by maintaining 
long-run spending rates below return rates, current endowment managers may be tempted 
to reduce the distributions to further protect endowment wealth instead of increasing the 
payout rate as a buttress for the operations dependent on endowment support. Cejnek et 
al. (2017) found a substitution effect between donations and returns. A reduction in 
giving can be counterbalanced by an increase in return. Loss of contributions to the 
university, not just the endowment, may lead to higher-risk investment strategies to strive 
for greater return to compensate. Overall, higher education endowments underperform 
market benchmarks, but selective schools have stronger performance (Dahiya & 
Yermack, 2018; Lerner et al., 2008). Less-selective schools and smaller endowments, in 
an attempt to mimic the more successful endowments, may damage their own 
endowments even further by engaging in high-risk investment practices. 
Consistent, sustained loss of contributions in the range of 4.5% may not be 
viewed as a financial shock to higher education endowments. If the loss of contributions 
does not warrant immediate action or strategic movements, the distributions will 
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inevitably decline as a result of the customary payout model. NACUBO (2019a) notes the 
archetype distribution model is a defined percentage of a moving average of the 
endowment’s FMV. Without growth of the base the distribution growth will be limited to 
the rise in the market valuations. Hansmann (1990) opines this model violates the notion 
of a financial buffer for university operations as the model protects the endowment base 
more than the distribution stream. Cejnek et al. (2017) found smaller endowments 
endeavor to accumulate endowment wealth with lower or no payout rates. This study 
found smaller endowments are also more reliant on contributions to accumulate wealth. 
Those endowments may not discern the loss of contributions through the disbursement 
stream, but through the extension of time to accumulate endowment wealth. In many 
cases, no reaction to the decline in endowment giving will lead to a subtle decline in the 
base with a delayed decline in the distribution stream. These subtle declines could be 
further masked in a robust economy experiencing strong returns. The reality is, however, 
the loss in contributions will continue to erode the endowment wealth. 
This study also strives to contribute insights about institutional and endowment 
characteristics related to greater reliance on individual giving to endowments. The results 
are suggestive but inconclusive. Bivariate regression indicates several variables are 
correlated with reliance on individual giving to endowments, however multicollinearity 
concerns cast uncertainty on the results. The goal was not to determine causality but to 
identify characteristic patterns indicative of larger proportions of endowment gifts from 
contributions by individuals. The multivariate regression results point toward private 
institutions, institutions without hospitals, and endowments that are smaller when 
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measured by FMV. However, only the institutional control and endowment size variables 
are statistically significant in the preferred model.  
Ehrenberg and Smith (2003) found endowment wealth per student positively 
correlated with giving from all sources and a greater share of annual giving directed 
towards building the endowment. Their findings, however, are not necessarily indictive 
of a difference in proportions of giving by source. If all sources are giving more at a 
similar rate, there is little to no change in the allocation by source. The inconclusive 
results are a reminder that all endowed institutions need to have a heightened awareness 
of both direct and indirect tax policy implications on contributions to endowments. All 
endowments should be evaluating reliance on individual giving, realizing that reaction 
time to individual tax policy is shortened with greater reliance. 
Limitations and Future Research 
Limitations identified in the previous chapter are now restated within a 
framework of potential future research. The first limitation raised relates to the use of 
historical data to predict future outcomes without controlling for other factors including 
decision-altering behaviors. During this study the tax overhaul assumed, based on the 
TCJA, has been implemented and the first year of contribution data is being collected. 
Early reports indicate the loss of contributions is not as extreme as expected for 2018. 
Giving USA (2019) reports an inflation-adjusted decrease of 1.7% overall, but a decrease 
of 3.7% for the all-inclusive education sector. At this time, it is unknown if charitable 
entities were proactive in combating the expected loss of gifts. There is evidence that 
taxpayers altered behaviors to maximize tax benefits through the use of DAFs and 
bunching (contributing multiple years’ worth of gifts in a single year to qualify for 
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itemization with no or low gifting in the subsequent year or years). With the sweeping 
changes in individual tax policy, filers may not have been aware or fully informed of 
their personal change in tax benefits at the time of making donation decisions for tax year 
2018. Tax year 2019 may be more reflective of donation decisions responding to the 
TCJA. Once sufficient data is available, research can begin to test the tax-price elasticity 
assumptions used in this study and the microsimulations that informed parties interested 
in the predicted impact on contributions as a result of the TCJA. Much like the study 
conducted by Clotfelter (1990) following the Tax Reform Act of 1986, an examination of 
actual outcomes will provide informative research into the strength of tax-price of giving 
elasticity theory. 
Tax-price of giving elasticity assumptions, as noted in the literature review, are 
imprecise and applied in a highly aggregated manner. The generally-accepted elasticity is 
being applied to a very specific type of giver that may differ from the population, to a 
specific sector that may differ from the overall not-for-profit industry, and to a specific 
type of contribution vehicle that operates uniquely. At the most basic level, this study’s 
treatment of all endowment contributions as gifts from donors subjected to individual 
income tax regulations may misrepresent the predicted decrease in annual contribution 
revenue. While the second research question attempted to address this limitation, the low 
sample size and inconclusive results failed to mitigate the concern.  
Each sample fails to accurately represent the full population of higher education 
institutions reporting endowments and may bias the results. The first research question 
finding that erosion variances are greater for two-year publics and endowments with 
relatively small FMVs highlights that my results may underestimate the impact to the 
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higher education sector as a whole as those are the institutions not fully represented in the 
sample. The inconclusive findings of the second research question may also be driven by 
the lack of a sufficiently large and diverse sample. The results do, however, provide a 
baseline analysis to allow further research on the proportions of endowment giving by 
source trends. Changes in the giving source demographics, and the impetus and 
motivations for those changes, should be of interest to advancement units in higher 
education and other sectors with reliance on endowment assets. 
The broader limitation of the tax-price elasticity assumption identified previous 
research on elasticity by different types of donors, gifts, and charitable causes is limited, 
contradictory, or inconclusive. In light of the trendlines displayed in Figure 4, giving to 
endowments may have weaker tax-price elasticity and stronger income elasticity. There 
are several characteristics of endowment giving that may negate the otherwise-observed 
elasticity: perpetuity of gift (viewed more as an investment than a donation), status 
confirmation (with publication of gifts or naming rights), gift size, gift form (revenue-
generating assets, including investments and businesses with values dependent on the 
economic environment), and longevity of gifting period (pledges allocated over multiple 
years). With the recently revised tax regulatory environment, changes in donor behaviors 
provide opportunities to analyze tax-price of giving elasticity theory with greater 
precision. While the elasticity-defining limitation is concerning in the context of tax 
policy as the cause of endowment wealth erosion, this study’s findings are applicable to 
any sustained loss in charitable contributions to endowments. 
A provision in the TCJA not addressed in this study is a net investment income 
excise tax imposed on select institutions. Endowment investments and other non-
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charitable use assets of private colleges and universities with at least 500 tuition-paying 
FTE students and endowment assets of at least $500,000 per student are subject to the 
1.4% excise tax (U.S. House, 2017). The financial parameters for eligible institutions are 
not inflation-adjusted and while few colleges and universities are subject to the tax at 
enactment date, the number of entities effected is expected to increase over time. The 
excise tax was not included in this study as the policy does not alter individual donors’ 
incentives to give and is initially applicable for so few institutions. The implications of 
the tax on endowments and higher education finances is an area for future research. 
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Appendix 
Table A.1 
 
Frequency Distribution of Institutions by Carnegie Classification Groupings, 2017 
Carnegie 
Classification 
2015: Basic 
IPEDS 
Frequency 
(%) 
IPEDS 
Reporting 
Endowments 
Frequency 
(%) 
NCSE 
Frequency 
(%) 
VSE 
Frequency 
(%) 
Associate’s 
and Two-
Year 
1,057 
(27.3) 
688 (25.8) 27 (3.3) 120 (12.8) 
Baccalaureate 583 (15.0) 501 (18.8) 202 (25.0) 227 (24.1) 
Master’s 679 (17.5) 647 (24.3) 243 (30.0) 304 (32.3) 
Doctoral 312 (8.0) 307 (11.5) 304 (37.6) 250 (26.6) 
Special Focus 
Four-Year 
614 (15.8) 425 (16.0) 33 (4.1) 38 (4.0) 
Tribal 
Colleges 
34 (0.9) 26 (1.0)  –   2 (0.2) 
Not 
Accredited or  
Nondegree-
Granting 
599 (15.5) 70 (2.6)  –    –   
Total 3,878 2,664 809 941 
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Table A.2 
 
Frequency Distributions of Institutions Reporting Endowments by Carnegie 
Classification Groupings, 2017 
Carnegie 
Classification 
2015: Basic 
IPEDS 
Frequency 
(%) 
NCSE 
Frequency 
(%) 
VSE 
Frequency 
(%) 
RQ1 
Sample 
Frequency 
(%) 
RQ2 
Sample 
Frequency 
(%) 
Associate’s 
and  
Two-Year 
688 (25.8) 27 (3.3) 120 (12.8) 50 (7.7) 35 (5.6) 
Baccalaureate 501 (18.8) 202 (25.0) 227 (24.1) 168 (25.9) 175 (28.1) 
Master’s 647 (24.3) 243 (30.0) 304 (32.3) 204 (31.5) 204 (32.7) 
Doctoral 307 (11.5) 304 (37.6) 250 (26.6) 200 (30.9) 205 (32.9) 
Special Focus 
Four-Year 425 (16.0) 33 (4.1) 38 (4.0) 26 (4.0) 4 (0.7) 
Tribal 
Colleges 26 (1.0)  –   2 (0.2)  –    –   
Not 
Accredited or 
Nondegree-
Granting 
70 (2.6)  –    –    –    –   
Total 2,664 809 941 648 623 
 
Table A.3 
 
Frequency Distributions of Institutions Reporting Endowments by Institutional Control, 
2017 
Institutional 
Control 
IPEDS 
Frequency 
(%) 
NCSE 
Frequency 
(%) 
VSE 
Frequency 
(%) 
RQ1 
Sample 
Frequency 
(%) 
RQ2 
Sample 
Frequency 
(%) 
Private 1,355 (50.9) 507 (62.7) 455 (48.4) 340 (52.5) 328 (52.6) 
Public 1,309 (49.1) 302 (37.3) 486 (51.6) 308 (47.5) 295 (47.4) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
143 
	
 
Table A.4 
 
Endowment FMV Medians of Institutions Reporting Endowments by Institutional 
Control, 2017 
Institutional 
Control 
($ in 
millions) 
IPEDS 
Median 
Endowment 
FMV 
NCSE 
Median 
Endowment 
FMV 
VSE 
Median 
Endowment 
FMV 
RQ1 
Sample 
Median 
Endowment 
FMV 
RQ2 
Sample 
Median 
Endowment 
FMV 
Private $33 $136 $119 $161 $156 
Public $9 $106 $47 $71 $74 
 
 
 
Table A.5 
 
Descriptive Statistics for Actual Endowment FMV by Fiscal Year, unadjusted for 
inflation 
Fiscal 
Year Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum 
2008 550,450,626 76,888,849 2,157,289,000 221,979 36,260,085,000 
2009 427,300,897 59,163,292 1,584,871,000 356,185 25,423,481,000 
2010 465,689,140 66,672,076 1,702,437,000 388,317 26,970,079,000 
2011 543,137,640 78,530,855 1,992,270,000 241,371 31,419,653,000 
2012 540,737,805 79,151,453 1,978,266,000 252,818 30,142,698,000 
2013 593,431,656 88,863,545 2,132,302,000 296,583 32,034,733,000 
2014 685,073,836 98,663,262 2,446,724,000 365,418 35,556,718,000 
2015 706,635,146 99,822,987 2,536,770,000 407,272 36,127,220,000 
2016 688,540,026 101,655,321 2,471,537,000 429,665 34,219,206,000 
2017 756,629,401 110,430,278 2,666,715,000 464,758 35,657,090,000 
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Table A.6 
 
Descriptive Statistics for Actual Contributions to Endowment by Fiscal Year, unadjusted 
for inflation 
Fiscal Year Mean Median Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum 
2008 11,010,118 2,455,772 29,047,000 – 297,862,000 
2009 8,028,046 1,685,639 21,468,000 – 249,251,658 
2010 8,146,457 1,845,899 20,358,000 – 240,793,000 
2011 9,420,589 2,147,480 25,192,000 – 321,400,113 
2012 9,267,245 1,984,586 27,764,000 – 409,196,863 
2013 9,718,385 2,178,222 23,263,000 – 222,691,000 
2014 12,199,280 2,384,040 34,844,000 – 512,853,000 
2015 11,597,944 2,659,213 29,358,000 – 361,038,201 
2016 11,767,057 2,150,955 31,832,000 – 488,798,691 
2017 13,423,009 2,476,739 39,869,000 – 515,494,565 
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Table A.7 
 
Descriptive Statistics for Predicted Endowment FMV by Fiscal Year, unadjusted for 
inflation 
Fiscal 
Year Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum 
2008 549,946,738 76,688,991 2,156,144,000 221,489 36,245,429,709 
2009 426,617,711 58,866,312 1,583,415,000 354,499 25,406,539,853 
2010 464,546,744 66,283,099 1,699,974,000 386,095 26,940,229,988 
2011 541,336,295 78,249,462 1,988,307,000 239,852 31,373,518,950 
2012 538,569,866 78,512,555 1,973,274,000 249,990 30,088,587,996 
2013 590,581,663 88,298,196 2,125,925,000 289,813 31,966,568,442 
2014 681,228,847 98,064,463 2,437,927,000 355,533 35,455,900,268 
2015 702,200,822 98,618,257 2,526,558,000 395,833 36,008,792,088 
2016 683,757,753 99,692,180 2,460,369,000 417,435 34,087,109,080 
2017 750,778,964 109,457,492 2,652,988,000 451,530 35,496,591,374 
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